Julian Savulescu has given clear expression to a principle—that of “procreative beneficence”—which underlies the thought of many contemporary writers on bioethics. The principle of procreative beneficence (PPB) holds that parents or single reproducers are at least prima facie obliged to select the child, out of a range of possible children they might have, who will be likely to lead the best life. My aim in this paper is to argue that prospective parents, just by dint of their being prospective parents, are in fact not obliged to act on PPB. That is, there is something about their filling the role of prospective parents that exempts them from selecting the child with the best life. I urge that it is more realistic to view prospective parents as bound by a principle of acceptable outlook, which holds that they ought not to select children whose lives will contain an unacceptable amount of suffering.
- PAO, principle of acceptable outlook
- PGD, preimplantation genetic diagnosis
- PPB, principle of procreative beneficence
- procreative beneficence
- preimplantation genetic diagnosis
- prospective parent
- embryo selection
Statistics from Altmetric.com
If you wish to reuse any or all of this article please use the link below which will take you to the Copyright Clearance Center’s RightsLink service. You will be able to get a quick price and instant permission to reuse the content in many different ways.
Read the full text or download the PDF:
Other content recommended for you
- Is procreative beneficence obligatory?
- The best possible child
- On the partiality of procreative beneficence: a critical note
- In defence of Procreative Beneficence
- Sex selection for social purposes in Israel: quest for the “perfect child” of a particular gender or centuries old prejudice against women?
- Moral reasons to edit the human genome: picking up from the Nuffield report
- The right not to know and preimplantation genetic diagnosis for Huntington’s disease
- Prenatal screening and prenatal diagnosis: contemporary practices in light of the past
- Three models for the regulation of polygenic scores in reproduction
- Our right to in vitro fertilisation—its scope and limits