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A dualist analysis of abortion: personhood and the concept of self qua experiential subject
- Correspondence to: Kenneth Einar Himma Department of Philosophy, University of Washington, Box 353350, Seattle, WA 98195, USA; KHimmacs.com
Citation
A dualist analysis of abortion: personhood and the concept of self qua experiential subject
Publication history
- Received June 18, 2002
- Accepted June 13, 2003
- Revised December 10, 2002
- First published January 5, 2005.
Online issue publication
April 27, 2016
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Copyright information
Copyright 2005 by the Journal of Medical Ethics
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