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A defence of the potential future of value theory
  1. D Marquis
  1. Correspondence to:
 Professor D Marquis, Department of Philosophy, 1445 Jayhawk Blvd, Room 3090, The University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas 66045-7590, USA;


In this issue of the journal Mark Brown has offered a new argument against my potential future of value theory. I argue that even though the premises of this new argument are far more defensible than the premises of his old argument, the new argument does not show that the potential future of value theory of the wrongness of killing is false. If the considerations to which Brown appeals are used, not to show that the potential future of value theory is false, but to show that abortion is morally permissible, they are also unsuccessful. I also argue that Brown's clarified self-represented future of value account and Simon Parsons's account of the wrongness of killing are both subject to major difficulties. Finally, I show, in an appendix, that Brown's assertion that my discussion of his views suffers from major logical errors is false.

  • Abortion
  • future of value
  • Mark Brown
  • Don Marquis
  • the right to life
  • welfare rights

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