Michael Lockwood has recently concluded that it can be morally permissible to perform potentially damaging non-therapeutic experiments on live human (pre)embryos. The reasons he provides in support of this conclusion commit him inter alia to the following controversial theses: (i) an organism's potential for twinning bears critically on the identity conditions for that organism; and (ii) functionally intact mentality-mediating neurological structures play a critical role in establishing the identity conditions for human organisms. I argue that Lockwood has given us no good reason to endorse either of these theses and, hence, that he has given us no good reason to believe that it can be morally permissible to perform potentially damaging non-therapeutic experiments on live human (pre)embryos.
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