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<title>Journal of Medical Ethics</title>
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<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/653?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The concise argument]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/653?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Holm, S.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 10:01:40 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Oncology, Health policy, Clinical diagnostic tests]]></dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/jme.2009.033589</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The concise argument]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>11</prism:number>
<prism:volume>35</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>653</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>653</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>The concise argument</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/654?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Eyewitness in Erewhon Academic Hospital]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/654?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[de Beaufort, I, Meulenberg, F]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 10:01:40 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Child health, Hospice, Undergraduate, Philosophy of medicine]]></dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/jme.2009.029629</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Eyewitness in Erewhon Academic Hospital]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>11</prism:number>
<prism:volume>35</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>655</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>654</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Eyewitness</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/656?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Re-consenting human subjects: ethical, legal and practical issues]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/656?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Resnik, D B]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 10:01:40 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/jme.2009.030338</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Re-consenting human subjects: ethical, legal and practical issues]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>11</prism:number>
<prism:volume>35</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>657</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>656</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Commentary</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/658?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Agency, duties and the "Ashley treatment"]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/658?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>In 2006, a paper in the journal <I>Archives of Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine</I> described a novel case of growth attenuation therapy and other treatments carried out on Ashley, a severely cognitively, neurologically and physically disabled 6-year-old girl. Some of the moral arguments that have sprung up in respect of the so-called "Ashley treatment" are considered, and it is suggested that they all miss something&mdash;that the proper treatment of Ashley may have as much to do with doctors&rsquo; duties to themselves as with their duties to her. It is suggested that the Ashley treatment may have been in violation of doctors&rsquo; self-regarding duties and that this possibility is worthy of further investigation.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tan, N, Brassington, I]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 10:01:41 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Disability]]></dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/jme.2009.029934</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Agency, duties and the "Ashley treatment"]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>11</prism:number>
<prism:volume>35</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>661</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>658</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Controversy</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/662?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Process and consensus: ethical decision-making in the infertility clinic--a qualitative study]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/662?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Infertility treatment is a speciality that has attracted considerable attention both from the public and bioethicists. The focus of this attention has mainly been on the dramatic dilemmas created by theses technologies. Relatively little is known, however, about how clinicians approach and resolve ethical issues on an everyday basis. The central aim of this study is to gain insight into these neglected aspects of practice. It was found that, for the clinicians, the process by which ethical decisions were made was of key importance. It will be argued that this focus on the process of decision-making is more than just empty proceduralism but is based on and facilitates certain substantive ethical principles. In conclusion, suggestions as to how ethical decision-making processes can be supported and improved in infertility practice will be made.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Frith, L]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 10:01:41 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/jme.2009.029793</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Process and consensus: ethical decision-making in the infertility clinic--a qualitative study]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>11</prism:number>
<prism:volume>35</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>667</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>662</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Papers</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/668?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[NICE guidelines, clinical practice and antisocial personality disorder: the ethical implications of ontological uncertainty]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/668?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>The British National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) has recently (28 January 2009) released new guidelines for the diagnosis, treatment and prevention of the psychiatric category antisocial personality disorder (ASPD). Evident in these recommendations is a broader ambiguity regarding the ontology of ASPD. Although, perhaps, a mundane feature of much of medicine, in this case, ontological uncertainty has significant ethical implications as a product of the profound consequences for an individual categorised with this disorder. This paper argues that in refraining from emphasising uncertainty, NICE risks reifying a controversial category. This is particularly problematical given that the guidelines recommend the identification of individuals "at risk" of raising antisocial children. Although this paper does not argue that NICE is "wrong" in any of its recommendations, more emphasis should have been placed on discussions of the ethical implications of diagnosis and treatment, especially given the multiple uncertainties associated with ASPD. It is proposed that these important issues be examined in more detail in revisions of existing NICE recommendations, and be included in upcoming guidance. This paper thus raises key questions regarding the place and role of ethics within the current and future remit of NICE.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Pickersgill, M D]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 10:01:41 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Psychology and medicine]]></dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/jme.2009.030171</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[NICE guidelines, clinical practice and antisocial personality disorder: the ethical implications of ontological uncertainty]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>11</prism:number>
<prism:volume>35</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>671</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>668</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Papers</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/672?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Autonomy at the end of life: life-prolonging treatment in nursing homes--relatives' role in the decision-making process]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/672?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<sec><st>Background:</st>
<p>The increasing number of elderly people in nursing homes with failing competence to give consent represents a great challenge to healthcare staff&rsquo;s protection of patient autonomy in the issues of life-prolonging treatment, hydration, nutrition and hospitalisation. The lack of national guidelines and internal routines can threaten the protection of patient autonomy.</p>
</sec>
<sec><st>Objectives:</st>
<p>To place focus on protecting patient autonomy in the decision-making process by studying how relatives experience their role as substitute decision-makers.</p>
</sec>
<sec><st>Design:</st>
<p>A qualitative descriptive design with analysis of the contents of transcribed in-depth interviews with relatives.</p>
</sec>
<sec><st>Participants:</st>
<p>Fifteen relatives of 20 patients in 10 nursing homes in Norway.</p>
</sec>
<sec><st>Results and Interpretations:</st>
<p>The main findings reveal deficient procedures for including relatives in decision-making processes. Relatives have poor knowledge about the end of life, and there is little discussion about their role as substitute decision-makers for patients who are not competent to give consent. Few relatives understand the concept of patient autonomy. In Norway the treating physician is responsible for patient treatment. When relatives are included in discussions on treatment, they perceive themselves as responsible for the decision, which is a burden for them afterwards. This qualitative study describes relatives&rsquo; experiences, thus providing important information on the improvement potential with the main objective of safeguarding patient autonomy and caring for relatives.</p>
</sec>
<sec><st>Conclusion:</st>
<p>The study reveals failing procedures and thus a great potential for improvement. Both ethical and legal aspects must be addressed when considering patient autonomy.</p>
</sec>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Dreyer, A, Forde, R, Nortvedt, P]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 10:01:41 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[End of life decisions (geriatric medicine), End of life decisions (palliative care), End of life decisions (ethics)]]></dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/jme.2009.030668</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Autonomy at the end of life: life-prolonging treatment in nursing homes--relatives' role in the decision-making process]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>11</prism:number>
<prism:volume>35</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>677</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>672</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Papers</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/678?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Should we enhance animals?]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/678?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Much bioethical discussion has been devoted to the subject of human enhancement through various technological means such as genetic modification. Although many of the same technologies could be, indeed in many cases already have been, applied to non-human animals, there has been very little consideration of the concept of "animal enhancement", at least not in those specific terms. This paper addresses the notion of animal enhancement and the ethical issues surrounding it. A definition of animal enhancement is proposed that provides a framework within which to consider these issues; and it is argued that if human enhancement can be considered to be a moral obligation, so too can animal enhancement.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Chan, S]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 10:01:41 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Bioethics]]></dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/jme.2009.029512</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Should we enhance animals?]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>11</prism:number>
<prism:volume>35</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>683</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>678</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Papers</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/684?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Fallacies in the arguments for new technology: the case of proton therapy]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/684?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>In a seminal article in the <I>Journal of Medical Ethics</I>, S&oslash;ren Holm and Tuja Takala analysed two protechnology arguments in bioethics: the <I>hopeful principle</I> and the <I>automatic escalator</I>. They showed how these arguments relate to problematic arguments such as the <I>precautionary principle</I> and the empirical <I>slippery slope argument</I>, and argued that they should be used with great caution. The present article investigates the recent debate on proton beam therapy, where the hopeful principle and the automatic escalator are identified. However, the debate reveals a series of other arguments that deserve similar caution. An analysis of these arguments indicates that the roots of their fallacies are to be found in the ignorance of the uncertainties about risks and benefits and an overly optimistic attitude towards technology and progress. The point is not to argue against proton therapy, but rather to point out that flawed arguments for new technologies, such as proton therapy, can actually hamper their implementation instead of promoting it. Patients deserve the best technology available, not only on the basis of the best available evidence, but also on the basis of the best arguments.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hofmann, B]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 10:01:41 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/jme.2009.030981</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Fallacies in the arguments for new technology: the case of proton therapy]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>11</prism:number>
<prism:volume>35</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>687</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>684</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Papers</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/688?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Telecare and self-management: opportunity to change the paradigm?]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/688?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Telecare, the provision of care through remote interaction enabled by information and communication technology, is quickly developing. Integration with other technological developments is to be expected and will create systems that enable more intense, continuous and unobtrusive monitoring of health, and more personalised feedback and instructions. One of the goals of telecare is enhancing the independence and self-management of patients. In this article three degrees of self-management are described and a distinction is made between compliant and concordant forms of self-management. It is argued that telecare merely promotes forms of self-management in which compliance to medical instructions is central. Technological developments and normative policy considerations may enforce this trend to implement an interpretation of self-management in which compliance to a strict medical regime is prominent. Against this, a plea is made for developing telecare systems that incorporate concordant and collaborative forms of self-management, in which the patient&rsquo;s own perspective is empowered.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Schermer, M]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 10:01:41 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/jme.2009.030973</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Telecare and self-management: opportunity to change the paradigm?]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>11</prism:number>
<prism:volume>35</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>691</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>688</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Papers</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/692?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Solo doctors and ethical isolation]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/692?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This paper uses the case of solo doctors to explore whether working in relative isolation from one&rsquo;s peers may be detrimental to ethical decision-making. Drawing upon the relevance of communication and interaction for ethical decision-making in the ethical theories of Habermas, Mead and Gadamer, it is argued that doctors benefit from ethical discussion with their peers and that solo practice may make this more difficult. The paper identifies a paucity of empirical research related to solo practice and ethics but draws upon more general medical ethics research and a study that identified ethical isolation among community pharmacists to support the theoretical claims made. The paper concludes by using the literary analogy of Soderberg&rsquo;s Doctor Glas to illustrate the issues raised and how ethical decision-making in relative isolation may be problematical.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Cooper, R J]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 10:01:41 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/jme.2009.031765</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Solo doctors and ethical isolation]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>11</prism:number>
<prism:volume>35</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>695</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>692</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Papers</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/696?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Harmonisation of ethics committees' practice in 10 European countries]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/696?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<sec><st>Background:</st>
<p>The Directive 2001/20/EC was an important first step towards consistency in the requirements and processes for clinical trials across Europe. However, by applying the same rules to all types of drug trials and transposing the Directive&rsquo;s principles into pre-existing national legislations, the Directive somewhat failed to meet its facilitation and harmonisation targets. In the field of ethics, the Directive 2001/20/EC conditioned the way of understanding and transposing the "single opinion" process in each country. This led to a situation in which two models of research ethics committees organisation systems exist, being the model in which the "single opinion" is considered to be the decision made by a single ethics committee more effective and simpler in terms of administrative and logistic workload.</p>
</sec>
<sec><st>Method:</st>
<p>A survey was conducted in 10 European countries. Members of the European Clinical Research Infrastructures Network working party number 1, with expertise in the field of ethics, responded.</p>
</sec>
<sec><st>Results:</st>
<p>There is a major heterogeneity in the composition of ethics committees among the surveyed countries based on the number of members, proportion of experts versus lay members and expertise of the scientific members. A harmonised education of the ethics committees&rsquo; membership based in common curricula is recommended by the majority of countries.</p>
</sec>
<sec><st>Conclusions:</st>
<p>Despite the efforts for harmonisation of the European Clinical Trial Directive, from an ethical point of view, there remains a plurality of ethics committees' systems in Europe. It is important to comprehend the individual national systems to understand the problems they are facing.</p>
</sec>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hernandez, R, Cooney, M, Duale, C, Galvez, M, Gaynor, S, Kardos, G, Kubiak, C, Mihaylov, S, Pleiner, J, Ruberto, G, Sanz, N, Skoog, M, Souri, P, Stiller, C O, Strenge-Hesse, A, Vas, A, Winter, D, Carne, X]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 10:01:41 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Research and publication ethics]]></dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/jme.2009.030551</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Harmonisation of ethics committees' practice in 10 European countries]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>11</prism:number>
<prism:volume>35</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>700</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>696</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Papers</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/701?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The acceptability among French lay persons of ending the lives of damaged newborns]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/701?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<sec><st>Background:</st>
<p>Lay persons&rsquo; judgements of the acceptability of the not uncommon practice of ending the life of a damaged neonate have not been studied.</p>
</sec>
<sec><st>Methods:</st>
<p>A convenience sample of 1635 lay people in France rated how acceptable it would be for a physician to end a neonate&rsquo;s life&mdash;by withholding care, withdrawing care, or active euthanasia&mdash;in 54 scenarios in which the neonate was diagnosed either with perinatal asphyxia or a genetic abnormality. The scenarios were all combinations of four factors: three levels of maturity or immaturity, three levels of severity of the health problem, three levels of parents&rsquo; preference concerning prolonging care and two levels of decision-making (with or without consulting the other caregivers).</p>
</sec>
<sec><st>Analyses:</st>
<p>Analyses of variance of the participants&rsquo; responses were performed to determine the importance of each factor; the interactions among factors, with methods of ending life and with other patient characteristics; and the differences between asphyxia and genetic abnormality. A cluster analysis was performed to look for groups with different patterns of responses.</p>
</sec>
<sec><st>Results:</st>
<p>Lay people assigned most importance to the parents&rsquo; request and to the severity of the problem. Except for a small group (12%) always opposed to ending life, they used a simple additive-type rule in integrating the information.</p>
</sec>
<sec><st>Implications:</st>
<p>Most of this sample of French lay people are not categorically for or against ending the life of a damaged neonate, but judge its degree of acceptability by adding up those factors that seem most salient to them.</p>
</sec>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Teisseyre, N, dos Reis, I D., Sorum, P C, Mullet, E]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 10:01:41 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[End of life decisions (geriatric medicine), End of life decisions (palliative care), Assisted dying, End of life decisions (ethics)]]></dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/jme.2009.029686</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The acceptability among French lay persons of ending the lives of damaged newborns]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>11</prism:number>
<prism:volume>35</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>708</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>701</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Papers</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/709?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Who should consent for research in adult intensive care? Preferences of patients and their relatives: a pilot study]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/709?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<sec><st>Introduction:</st>
<p>Research in intensive care is necessary for the continuing advancement of patient care. In research, informed consent is considered essential for patient protection. In intensive care, the modalities of informed consent are currently being debated by both lawyers and the medical community. The preferences of patients and their relatives regarding informed consent for research in intensive care have never been assessed. The aim of this study was to investigate these preferences.</p>
</sec>
<sec><st>Methods:</st>
<p>A pilot study conducted via a questionnaire mailed to patients and relatives who had experienced intensive care.</p>
</sec>
<sec><st>Results:</st>
<p>52/400 patient&ndash;relative pairs completed the questionnaire fully. If the patient was imagined to be conscious, 75% of patients and 77% of relatives believed the patient should be the person who should consent. If the patient was imagined to be unconscious, 72% of patients and 67% of relatives thought that a relative should be asked to consent. The majority of responders thought that at least two persons should consent. Their answers were concordant in 61&ndash;80% of cases, depending on the question. Patients (25%) and relatives (30%) did not feel free in their decision to participate in a study. The majority of patients and relatives wanted to consent by writing, indifferently with or without a witness.</p>
</sec>
<sec><st>Conclusion:</st>
<p>Patients are willing to decide on their own participation in a study. If they lose their capacity to decide for themselves, in the great majority of cases, they would agree to delegate the decision to a relative.</p>
</sec>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Chenaud, C, Merlani, P, Verdon, M, Ricou, B]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 10:01:41 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Patients, Adult intensive care, Informed consent, Legal and forensic medicine]]></dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/jme.2008.028068</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Who should consent for research in adult intensive care? Preferences of patients and their relatives: a pilot study]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>11</prism:number>
<prism:volume>35</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>712</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>709</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Papers</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/713?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[On the ethics of oestrogen treatment for tall girls: an update]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/713?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>New empirical evidence on the long-term effects of oestrogen treatment for tall adolescent girls has shown that the intended psychosocial benefit of the treatment may not have been realised. This paper describes recent trends in the prevalence of the treatment and the results of a large Australian cohort study evaluating girls assessed between 1959 and 1993 for excessive growth. The paper concludes that oestrogen treatment to prevent extreme tallness should belong to the past, not to the future.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Louhiala, P]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 10:01:41 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Epidemiologic studies]]></dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/jme.2009.030189</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[On the ethics of oestrogen treatment for tall girls: an update]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>11</prism:number>
<prism:volume>35</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>714</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>713</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Brief report</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/715?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Ethics briefings]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/35/11/715?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Chrispin, E, Brannan, S, English, V, Mussell, R, Sheather, J, Sommerville, A]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 10:01:41 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[End of life decisions (geriatric medicine), End of life decisions (palliative care), Suicide (psychiatry), Assisted dying, End of life decisions (ethics), Human rights, Suicide (public health)]]></dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/jme.2009.032870</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Ethics briefings]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>11</prism:number>
<prism:volume>35</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>716</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>715</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Ethics briefings</prism:section>
</item>

</rdf:RDF>