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<title>Journal of Medical Ethics</title>
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<link>http://jme.bmj.com</link>
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<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100079v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Rationality, religion and refusal of treatment in an ambulance revisited]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100079v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>In their recent article, Erbay <I>et al</I> considered whether a seriously injured patient should be able to refuse treatment if the refusal was based on a (mis)interpretation of religious doctrine. They argued that in such a case &lsquo;what is important...is whether the teaching or philosophy used as a reference point has been in fact correctly perceived&rsquo; (p 653). If it has not been, they asserted that this eroded the patient's capacity to make an autonomous decision and that therefore, in such cases, it is the role of the healthcare professional (HCP) to &lsquo;assist patients to think more clearly and rationally&rsquo; (p 653). There are, however, a number of problems with the reasons <I>why</I> Erbay <I>et al</I> suggest we should help patients to rationalise their decisions and <I>how</I> HCPs should go about this. In this article, the author explores some of their main arguments regarding consent and rationality (particularly in relation to religious beliefs), as well as Erbay <I>et al</I>'s normative claim that HCPs have an obligation to promote autonomy by helping patients to come to a &lsquo;rational&rsquo; decision. Ultimately, the author agrees that the (temporary) solution to the dilemma presented in this scenario (which was to insert an intravenous cannula into the patient in order to allow an infusion of fluids in the event that he changed his mind) seemed both pragmatic and ethically permissible. However, it is suggested that the arguments which underpin this conclusion in Erbay <I>et al</I>'s article are largely unsound.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[McMahon-Parkes, K.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-05-16T02:00:56-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100079</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100079</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Emergency medicine, Bioethics]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Rationality, religion and refusal of treatment in an ambulance revisited]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-05-16</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Clinical ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2012-100600v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Attitudes of African-American parents about biobank participation and return of results for themselves and their children]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2012-100600v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<sec><st>Introduction</st><p>Biobank-based research is growing in importance. A major controversy exists about the return of aggregate and individual research results.</p></sec><sec><st>Methods</st><p>The authors used a mixed-method approach in order to study parents' attitudes towards the return of research results regarding themselves and their children. Participants attended four 2-h, deliberative-engagement sessions held on two consecutive Saturdays. Each session consisted of an educational presentation followed by focus-group discussions with structured questions and prompts. This manuscript examines discussions from the second Saturday which focused on the benefits and risks of returning aggregate and individual research results regarding both adults (morning session) and children (afternoon session). Attitudes were assessed in pre-engagement and post-engagement surveys.</p></sec><sec><st>Results</st><p>The authors recruited 45 African-American adults whose children received medical care at two healthcare facilities on the South Side of Chicago that serve different socioeconomic communities. Three dominant themes were identified. First, most participants stated that they would enrol themselves and their children in a biobank, although there was a vocal minority opposed to enrolling children, particularly children unable to participate in the consent process. Second, participants did not distinguish between the results they wanted to receive regarding themselves and their children. Supplemental survey data found no attitudinal changes pre-engagement and post-engagement. Third, participants believed that children should be allowed access to their health information, but they wanted to be involved in deciding when and how the information was shared.</p></sec><sec><st>Discussion</st><p>Participant attitudes are in tension with current biobank policies. An intensive educational effort had no effect on their attitudes.</p></sec>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Halverson, C. M. E., Ross, L. F.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-05-09T02:01:09-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2012-100600</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2012-100600</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Research and publication ethics]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Attitudes of African-American parents about biobank participation and return of results for themselves and their children]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-05-09</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Research ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100413v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Ethical questions must be considered for electronic health records]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100413v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>National electronic health record initiatives are in progress in many countries around the world but the debate about the ethical issues and how they are to be addressed remains overshadowed by other issues. The discourse to which all others are answerable is a technical discourse, even where matters of privacy and consent are concerned. Yet a focus on technical issues and a failure to think about ethics are cited as factors in the failure of the UK health record system. In this paper, while the prime concern is the Australian Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record (PCEHR), the discussion is relevant to and informed by the international context. The authors draw attention to ethical and conceptual issues that have implications for the success or failure of electronic health records systems. Important ethical issues to consider as Australia moves towards a PCEHR system include: issues of equity that arise in the context of personal control, who benefits and who should pay, what are the legitimate uses of PCEHRs, and how we should implement privacy. The authors identify specific questions that need addressing.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Spriggs, M., Arnold, M. V., Pearce, C. M., Fry, C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-05-09T02:01:09-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100413</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100413</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Health informatics, Human rights]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Ethical questions must be considered for electronic health records]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-05-09</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Clinical ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2012-100598v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Commentary on predictive genetic testing of minors: by Mand et al]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2012-100598v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The paper by Mand <I>et al</I> raises important questions about the predictive genetic testing of children. They focus on those claims made by professionals that are open to empirical enquiry and give too little weight to those claims that do not require empirical support. The authors remind us that some commentators oppose empirical enquiry because of the concern that gathering evidence of the consequences of such testing may itself be harmful or unethical. They respond by asserting that the relevant research questions are &lsquo;eminently testable&rsquo; but fail to discuss the challenges of such research, including the questions of timescale, consent or the nature of the data whose collection (they assert) would resolve the perceived difficulties with the genetic testing of children. They conclude that empirical research is required without resolving the weighty arguments against predictive testing of young children or explaining how the evidence they wish to collect could overcome the force of the arguments that favour caution.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Clarke, A. J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-05-05T02:01:05-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2012-100598</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2012-100598</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Commentary on predictive genetic testing of minors: by Mand et al]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-05-05</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Commentary</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100209v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Does medical insurance type (private vs public) influence the physician's decision to perform Caesarean delivery?]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100209v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<sec><st>Introduction</st><p>US data reveal a Caesarean rate discrepancy between insured and uninsured patients, with the C-section rate highest among the privately insured. The data have prompted concern that financial incentives associated with insurance status might influence American physicians' decisions to perform Caesarean deliveries.</p></sec><sec><st>Objective</st><p>To determine whether differences in medical risk factors account for the apparent Caesarean rate discrepancy between Medicaid and privately insured patients in Michigan, USA.</p></sec><sec><st>Method</st><p>A retrospective review was performed of 617 269 live birth deliveries in Michigan hospitals during 2004&ndash;8. All live birth records that were able to be linked to their mothers' hospital discharge records were utilised. Diagnosis-related group codes from the hospitalisation records were used to identify Caesarean deliveries. Regression models determined Caesarean probability for the time period under study, adjusted for insurance type, maternal age, race, maternal medical conditions, multiple births, prematurity and birth weight.</p></sec><sec><st>Results</st><p>From 2004 to 2008, Caesarean rates were 33% for privately insured patients and 29% for Medicaid patients. The probability of Caesarean delivery was significantly greater for privately insured than Medicaid patients on univariate analysis (OR 1.2, 95% CI 1.19 to 1.22) but not on multivariate analysis (adjusted OR 1.01, 95% CI 0.99 to 1.02).</p></sec><sec><st>Conclusion</st><p>No significant disparity was found in the odds of Caesarean delivery between privately insured and Medicaid patients in Michigan after adjusting for other Caesarean risk factors. A positive disparity would have provided de facto evidence that financial incentives play a role in physician decision-making regarding Caesarean delivery.</p></sec>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Movsas, T. Z., Wells, E., Mongoven, A., Grigorescu, V.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-05-05T02:03:14-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100209</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100209</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Health policy, Epidemiologic studies, Health service research]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Does medical insurance type (private vs public) influence the physician's decision to perform Caesarean delivery?]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-05-05</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Clinical ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100479v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Medical futility at the end of life: the perspectives of intensive care and palliative care clinicians]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100479v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<sec><st>Objectives</st><p>Medical futility at the end of life is a growing challenge to medicine. The goals of the authors were to elucidate how clinicians define futility, when they perceive life-sustaining treatment (LST) to be futile, how they communicate this situation and why LST is sometimes continued despite being recognised as futile.</p></sec><sec><st>Methods</st><p>The authors reviewed ethics case consultation protocols and conducted semi-structured interviews with 18 physicians and 11 nurses from adult intensive and palliative care units at a tertiary hospital in Germany. The transcripts were subjected to qualitative content analysis.</p></sec><sec><st>Results</st><p>Futility was identified in the majority of case consultations. Interviewees associated futility with the failure to achieve goals of care that offer a benefit to the patient's quality of life and are proportionate to the risks, harms and costs. Prototypic examples mentioned are situations of irreversible dependence on LST, advanced metastatic malignancies and extensive brain injury. Participants agreed that futility should be assessed by physicians after consultation with the care team. Intensivists favoured an indirect and stepwise disclosure of the prognosis. Palliative care clinicians focused on a candid and empathetic information strategy. The reasons for continuing futile LST are primarily emotional, such as guilt, grief, fear of legal consequences and concerns about the family's reaction. Other obstacles are organisational routines, insufficient legal and palliative knowledge and treatment requests by patients or families.</p></sec><sec><st>Conclusion</st><p>Managing futility could be improved by communication training, knowledge transfer, organisational improvements and emotional and ethical support systems. The authors propose an algorithm for end-of-life decision making focusing on goals of treatment.</p></sec>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jox, R. J., Schaider, A., Marckmann, G., Borasio, G. D.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-05-05T02:03:13-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100479</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100479</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Cardiovascular medicine, End of life decisions (geriatric medicine), End of life decisions (palliative care), Hospice, Adult intensive care, End of life decisions (ethics), Research and publication ethics]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Medical futility at the end of life: the perspectives of intensive care and palliative care clinicians]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-05-05</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Clinical ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100205v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[A capacity-based approach for addressing ancillary care needs: implications for research in resource limited settings]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100205v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>A paediatric clinical trial conducted in a developing country is likely to encounter conditions or illnesses in participants unrelated to the study. Since local healthcare resources may be inadequate to meet these needs, research clinicians may face the dilemma of deciding when to provide ancillary care and to what extent. The authors propose a model for identifying ancillary care obligations that draws on assessments of urgency, the capacity of the local healthcare infrastructure and the capacity of the research infrastructure. The model lends itself to a decision tree that can be adapted to the local context and resources so as to provide procedural guidance. This approach can help in planning and establishing organisational policies that govern the provision of ancillary care.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bright, P. L., Nelson, R. M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-05-05T02:03:13-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100205</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100205</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Cardiovascular medicine, Emergency medicine, HIV/AIDS, Child health, Sexual health]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[A capacity-based approach for addressing ancillary care needs: implications for research in resource limited settings]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-05-05</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Research ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100428v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The attitudes of neonatal professionals towards end-of-life decision-making for dying infants in Taiwan]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100428v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The purposes of research were to describe the neonatal clinicians' personal views and attitudes on neonatal ethical decision-making, to identify factors that might affect these attitudes and to compare the attitudes between neonatal physicians and neonatal nurses in Taiwan. Research was a cross-sectional design and a questionnaire was used to reach different research purposes. A convenient sample was used to recruit 24 physicians and 80 neonatal nurses from four neonatal intensive care units in Taiwan. Most participants agreed with suggesting a do not resuscitate (DNR) order to parents for dying neonates (86.5%). However, the majority agreed with talking to patients about DNR orders is difficult (76.9%). Most participants agree that review by the clinical ethics committee is needed before the recommendation of &lsquo;DNR&rsquo; to parents (94.23%) and nurses were significantly more likely than physicians to agree to this (p=0.043). During the end-of-life care, most clinicians accepted to continue current treatment without adding others (70%) and withholding of emergency treatments (75%); however, active euthanasia, the administration of drug to end-of-life, was not considered acceptable by both physicians and nurses in this research (96%). Based on our research results, providing continuing educational training and a formal consulting service in moral courage for neonatal clinicians are needed. In Taiwan, neonatal physicians and nurses hold similar values and attitudes towards end-of-life decisions for neonates. In order to improve the clinicians' communication skills with parents about DNR options and to change clinicians' attitudes for providing enough pain-relief medicine to dying neonates, providing continuing educational training and a formal consulting service in moral courage are needed.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Huang, L.-C., Chen, C.-H., Liu, H.-L., Lee, H.-Y., Peng, N.-H., Wang, T.-M., Chang, Y.-C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-05-05T02:01:06-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100428</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100428</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Cardiovascular medicine, Emergency medicine, Clinical ethics, End of life decisions (geriatric medicine), Child health, End of life decisions (palliative care), Adult intensive care, Assisted dying, End of life decisions (ethics), Research and publication ethics]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The attitudes of neonatal professionals towards end-of-life decision-making for dying infants in Taiwan]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-05-05</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Clinical ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100171v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Individual risk and community benefit in international research]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100171v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>It is widely agreed that medical researchers who conduct studies in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are morally required to ensure that their research benefits the broader host community, not only the subjects. The justification for this moral requirement has not been adequately examined. Most attempts to justify this requirement focus on researchers' interaction with the community as a whole, not on their relationship with their subjects. This paper argues that in some cases, research must benefit the broader host community for researchers to treat subjects and prospective subjects ethically. If research presents substantial net risks to subjects, researchers can ethically ask LMIC citizens to participate only if people in LMICs, normally including people in the host community, stand to benefit.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hughes, R. C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-05-05T02:01:05-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100171</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100171</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Individual risk and community benefit in international research]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-05-05</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Research ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2012-100524v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Accessibility and transparency of editor conflicts of interest policy instruments in medical journals]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2012-100524v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<sec><st>Background</st><p>There has been significant discussion about the need to manage conflict of interest (COI) in medical journals. This has lead many journals to implement policies to manage COI for authors and reviewers; however, surprisingly little attention has been focused on the COI of journal editors.</p></sec><sec><st>Objective</st><p>The goal of this exploratory study was to determine whether the policies were accessible to the public and to researchers, and to discuss the potential impact on public transparency.</p></sec><sec><st>Design</st><p>The authors conducted an internet search of editor COI policy instruments that have been developed, implemented and communicated by the top 10 peer-reviewed medical journals (2010 ISI Web of Knowledge Impact Factor), and assessed their general accessibility by gauging the level of difficulty in navigating the journal's website (number of clicks to find the policy instruments).</p></sec><sec><st>Results</st><p>Only four of the 10 medical journals (40%) in this study have accessible COI policy directives that include editors (<I>JIM</I>, <I>PLoS</I> <I>Medicine</I>, <I>AIM</I>, <I>CMAJ</I>). One journal (<I>NEJM</I>) had an editorial on the subject, and another (<I>The Lancet</I>) mentioned editor COI in their general guidelines. These documents are not readily accessible; starting from the journal's main website at least four <I>clicks</I> are needed to access these documents.</p></sec><sec><st>Conclusion</st><p>These results suggest that there is a general lack of accessible editor COI policy instruments among leading medical journals, something that may consequently have a negative impact on the trust accorded to these journals.</p></sec>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Smith, E., Potvin, M.-J., Williams-Jones, B.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-05-03T02:02:30-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2012-100524</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2012-100524</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Competing interests (ethics)]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Accessibility and transparency of editor conflicts of interest policy instruments in medical journals]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-05-03</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Research ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100190v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Is there no alternative? Conscientious objection by medical students]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100190v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Recent survey data gathered from British medical students reveal widespread acceptance of conscientious objection in medicine, despite the existence of strict policies in the UK that discourage conscientious refusals by students to aspects of their medical training. This disconnect demonstrates a pressing need to thoughtfully examine policies that allow conscience objections by medical students; as it so happens, the USA is one country that has examples of such policies. After presenting some background on promulgated US conscience protections and reflecting on their significance for conscience objections by medical students, this paper observes that the dominant approach (following the American Medical Association's conscience clause) is to allow exempted students to instead be evaluated on the basis of alternative curricular activities to learn the associated underlying content. This paper then introduces and discusses an example in which male Muslim students who believe it is wrong to touch members of the opposite sex object to performing physical examinations on female subjects in their medical training. This sort of case, it is argued, causes difficulty for a conscience clause that resolves the dilemma by granting reasonable exemptions in the form of participation in alternative curricular activities: there are cases where one must perform the &lsquo;objectionable&rsquo; activity itself in order to learn the necessary content and underlying principles.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Card, R. F.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-05-03T02:03:37-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100190</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100190</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Ethics of abortion, Ethics of reproduction, Undergraduate, Education, medical, Sex and sexuality]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Is there no alternative? Conscientious objection by medical students]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-05-03</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Law, ethics and medicine</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100372v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[A long shadow: Nazi doctors, moral vulnerability and contemporary medical culture]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100372v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>More than 7% of all German physicians became members of the Nazi SS during World War II, compared with less than 1% of the general population. In so doing, these doctors willingly participated in genocide, something that should have been antithetical to the values of their chosen profession. The participation of physicians in torture and murder both before and after World War II is a disturbing legacy seldom discussed in medical school, and underrecognised in contemporary medicine. Is there something inherent in being a physician that promotes a transition from healer to murderer? With this historical background in mind, the author, a medical student, defines and reflects upon moral vulnerabilities still endemic to contemporary medical culture.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Colaianni, A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-05-03T02:02:30-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100372</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100372</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[End of life decisions (geriatric medicine), End of life decisions (palliative care), Prison medicine, Assisted dying, End of life decisions (ethics), Ethics of reproduction, Undergraduate, Culture, health and illness]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[A long shadow: Nazi doctors, moral vulnerability and contemporary medical culture]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-05-03</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Teaching and learning ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100204v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Ethical and economic considerations of rare diseases in ethnic minorities: the case of mucopolysaccharidosis VI in Colombia]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100204v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Mucopolysaccharidosis VI is an autosomal recessive lysosomal storage disorder associated with severe disability and premature death. The presence of a mucopolysaccharidosis-like disease in indigenous ethnic groups in Colombia can be inferred from archaeological findings. There are several indigenous patients with mucopolysaccharidosis VI currently receiving enzyme replacement therapy. We discuss the ethical and economic considerations, regarding both direct and indirect costs, of a high-cost orphan disease in a marginalised minority population in a developing country.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rosselli, D., Rueda, J.-D., Solano, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-05-01T02:01:06-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100204</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100204</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Cardiovascular medicine, Unlocked, Complementary medicine, Informed consent, Legal and forensic medicine]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Ethical and economic considerations of rare diseases in ethnic minorities: the case of mucopolysaccharidosis VI in Colombia]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-05-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Brief report</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100216v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Physician obligation to provide care during disasters: should physicians have been required to go to Fukushima?]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100216v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>On 11 March 2011, Japan experienced a major disaster brought about by a 9.0-magnitude earthquake and a massive tsunami that followed. This disaster caused extensive damage to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant with the release of a large amount of radiation, leading to a crisis level 7 on the International Atomic Energy Agency scale. In this report, we discuss the obligations of physicians to provide care during the initial weeks after the disaster. We appeal to the obligation of general beneficence and argue that physicians should go to disaster zones only if there is no significant risk, cost or burden associated with doing so. We conclude that physicians were not obligated to go to Fukushima given the high risk of radiation exposure and physical and psychological harm. However, we must acknowledge that there were serious epistemic difficulties in accurately assessing the risks or benefits of travelling to Fukushima at the time. The discussion that follows is highly pertinent to all countries that rely on nuclear energy.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Akabayashi, A., Takimoto, Y., Hayashi, Y.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-04-27T02:01:24-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100216</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100216</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Physician obligation to provide care during disasters: should physicians have been required to go to Fukushima?]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-04-27</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Brief report</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100468v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Clinical ethics ward rounds: building on the core curriculum]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100468v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The clinical years of medical student education are an ideal time for students to practise and refine ethical thinking and behaviour. We piloted a new clinical ethics teaching activity this year with undergraduate medical students within the Rural Clinical School at the University of New South Wales. We used a modified teaching ward round model, with students bringing deidentified cases of ethical interest for round-table discussion. We found that students were more engaged in the subject of clinical ethics after attending the teaching sessions and particularly appreciated having structured time to listen to and learn from their peers. Despite this, we found no change in student involvement in managing or planning action in situations that they find ethically challenging. A key challenge for educators in clinical ethics is to address the barriers that prevent students taking action.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Parker, L., Watts, L., Scicluna, H.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-04-25T02:03:29-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100468</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100468</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Clinical ethics, End of life decisions (geriatric medicine), End of life decisions (palliative care), End of life decisions (ethics), Undergraduate]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Clinical ethics ward rounds: building on the core curriculum]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-04-25</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Teaching and learning ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100244v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Terminating pregnancy after prenatal diagnosis--with a little help of professional ethics?]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100244v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Termination of pregnancy after a certain gestational age and following prenatal diagnosis, in many nations seem to be granted with a special status to the extent that they by law have to be discussed within a predominantly medical context and have physicians as third parties involved in the decision-making process (&lsquo;indication-based&rsquo; approach). The existing legal frameworks for indication-based approaches, however, do frequently fail to provide clear guidance for the involved physicians. Critics, therefore, asked for professional ethics and professional institutions in order to provide normative guidance for the physicians in termination of pregnancy on medical grounds. After outlining the clinical pathway in an indication-based approach and the involved types of (clinical) judgements, this paper draws upon different understandings of professional ethics in order to explore their potential to provide normative guidance in termination of pregnancy on medical grounds. The analysis reveals that professional ethics will not suffice&mdash;neither as a set of established norms nor as internal morality&mdash;in order to determine the normative framework of indication-based approaches on termination of pregnancy. In addition, there seem to be considerable inconsistencies regarding the target and outcome between prenatal testing on the one hand and following termination of pregnancy on the other hand. A source of morality external to medicine has to be the basis of evaluation if a consistent and workable normative framework for termination of pregnancy and prenatal testing should be established.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Schmitz, D.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-04-21T02:01:05-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100244</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100244</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Ethics of abortion, Ethics of reproduction, Sex and sexuality, Human rights]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Terminating pregnancy after prenatal diagnosis--with a little help of professional ethics?]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-04-21</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Reproductive ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100206v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Enhancing informed consent best practices: gaining patient, family and provider perspectives using reverse simulation]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100206v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<sec><st>Background</st><p>Obtaining informed consent in the clinical setting is an important yet challenging aspect of providing safe and collaborative care to patients. While the medical profession has defined best practices for obtaining informed consent, it is unclear whether these standards meet the expressed needs of patients, their families as well as healthcare providers. The authors sought to address this gap by comparing the responses of these three groups with a standardised informed consent paradigm.</p></sec><sec><st>Methods</st><p>Piloting a web-based &lsquo;reverse&rsquo; simulation paradigm, participants viewed a video showing a standardised doctor engaging in an informed consent discussion. The scenario depicted a simulated patient with psychotic symptoms who is prescribed an atypical antipsychotic medication. 107 participants accessed the simulation online and completed a web-based debriefing survey.</p></sec><sec><st>Results</st><p>Survey responses from patients, family members and healthcare providers indicated disparities in information retention, perception of the doctor's performance and priorities for required elements of the consent process.</p></sec><sec><st>Conclusions</st><p>To enhance existing informed consent best practices, steps should be taken to improve patient retention of critical information. Adverse events should be described in the short-term and long-term along with preventative measures, and alternative psychosocial and pharmacological treatment options should be reviewed. Information about treatment should include when the medication takes therapeutic effect and how to safely maintain the treatment. The reverse simulation design is a model that can discern gaps in clinical practice, which can be used to improve patient care.</p></sec>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Goldfarb, E., Fromson, J. A., Gorrindo, T., Birnbaum, R. J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-04-21T02:01:05-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100206</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100206</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Patients, Informed consent, Research and publication ethics, Legal and forensic medicine]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Enhancing informed consent best practices: gaining patient, family and provider perspectives using reverse simulation]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-04-21</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Law, ethics and medicine</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2012-100578v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Helping doctors become better doctors: Mary Lobjoit--an unsung heroine of medical ethics in the UK]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2012-100578v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Medical Ethics has many unsung heros and heroines. Here we celebrate one of these and on telling part of her story hope to place modern medical ethics and bioethics in the UK more centrally within its historical and human contex.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Brazier, M. R., Gillon, R., Harris, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-04-19T02:02:43-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2012-100578</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2012-100578</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Unlocked, Bioethics, Undergraduate]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Helping doctors become better doctors: Mary Lobjoit--an unsung heroine of medical ethics in the UK]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-04-19</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Brief report</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2012-100622v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Comment on 'a capacity-based approach for addressing ancillary-care needs: implications for research in resource limited settings']]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2012-100622v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The paper by Bright and Nelson<cross-ref type="bib" refid="b1">1</cross-ref> makes several important contributions to the fast-growing literature on medical researchers' ancillary-care obligations. First, by focusing on investigators' day-to-day decision-making needs, it helpfully highlights the need for simple algorithms. The authors' decision tree is the kind of tool that researchers in the trenches will need when dealing with the great variety of ancillary-care needs that can arise in any study, both foreseeable and unexpected. Second, the authors have enriched the discussion by putting on the table a new position on the scope of ancillary-care obligations. Since I think everyone agrees that researchers are not obligated to do things they lack the capacity to do (that &lsquo;ought&rsquo; implies &lsquo;can,&rsquo; as moral philosophers put it), I would, despite their article's title, call this new position an &lsquo;urgency-based approach.&rsquo; Their novel suggestion is that, within the limits of capability, ancillary-care obligations apply when and only...]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Richardson, H. S.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-04-19T02:02:43-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2012-100622</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2012-100622</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Cardiovascular medicine, Research and publication ethics]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Comment on 'a capacity-based approach for addressing ancillary-care needs: implications for research in resource limited settings']]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-04-19</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Response</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2012-100557v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Resolving the impasse on predictive genetic testing in minors: will more evidence be the solution?]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2012-100557v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Discourse ethics when applied to the realm of medical practice seeks to construct a rational basis on which clinical decisions can be made by building a position based on iterative argument. What happens then, when such a process fails? In this paper, Mands <I>et al</I> report a detailed chronology and mapping of how arguments for and against the predictive genetic testing of minors for adult-onset conditions have evolved over time. They note that positions have changed very little, and suggest that because the same core arguments are cited again and again with only subtle variations and little demonstrable rapprochement between opposing camps, that a different approach is required. They contend that more evidence is necessary but tellingly also concede that resolution in this manner may only be arrived at for a subset of assertions made by the pro and contra parties. A core set of the contestable &lsquo;value claims&rsquo; apparently...]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Robertson, S. P., Kerruish, N.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-04-19T02:02:43-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2012-100557</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2012-100557</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Resolving the impasse on predictive genetic testing in minors: will more evidence be the solution?]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-04-19</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Commentary</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100304v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Reducing the harmful effects of alcohol misuse: the ethics of sobriety testing in criminal justice]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100304v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Alcohol use and abuse play a major role in both crime and negative health outcomes in Scotland. This paper provides a description and ethical and legal analyses of a novel remote alcohol monitoring scheme for offenders which seeks to reduce alcohol-related harm to both the criminal and the public. It emerges that the prospective benefits of this scheme to health and public order vastly outweigh any potential harms.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Shaw, D., McCluskey, K., Linden, W., Goodall, C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-04-19T02:02:43-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100304</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100304</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Emergency medicine, Prison medicine, Abuse (child, partner, elder), Violence against women]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Reducing the harmful effects of alcohol misuse: the ethics of sobriety testing in criminal justice]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-04-19</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Public health ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100145v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[A randomised controlled trial to compare opt-in and opt-out parental consent for childhood vaccine safety surveillance using data linkage]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100145v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<sec><st>Introduction</st><p>No consent for health and medical research is appropriate when the criteria for a waiver of consent are met, yet some ethics committees and data custodians still require informed consent.</p></sec><sec><st>Methods</st><p>A single-blind parallel-group randomised controlled trial: 1129 families of children born at a South Australian hospital were sent information explaining data linkage of childhood immunisation and hospital records for vaccine safety surveillance with 4&nbsp;weeks to opt in or opt out by reply form, telephone or email. A subsequent telephone interview gauged the intent of 1026 parents (91%) in relation to their actions and the sociodemographic differences between participants and non-participants in each arm.</p></sec><sec><st>Results</st><p>The participation rate was 21% (n=120/564) in the opt-in arm and 96% (n=540/565) in the opt-out arm (<sup>2</sup> (1 df) = 567.7, p&lt;0.001). Participants in the opt-in arm were more likely than non-participants to be older, married/de facto, university educated and of higher socioeconomic status. Participants in the opt-out arm were similar to non-participants, except men were more likely to opt out. Substantial proportions did not receive, understand or properly consider study invitations, and opting in or opting out behaviour was often at odds with parents' stated underlying intentions.</p></sec><sec><st>Conclusions</st><p>The opt-in approach resulted in low participation and a biased sample that would render any subsequent data linkage unfeasible, while the opt-out approach achieved high participation and a representative sample. The waiver of consent afforded under current privacy regulations for data linkage studies meeting all appropriate criteria should be granted by ethics committees, and supported by data custodians.</p></sec><sec><st>Trial registration number</st><p>Australian New Zealand Clinical Trials Registry ACTRN12610000332022.</p></sec>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Berry, J. G., Ryan, P., Gold, M. S., Braunack-Mayer, A. J., Duszynski, K. M., for the Vaccine Assessment Using Linked Data (VALiD) Working Group]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-04-19T02:02:43-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100145</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100145</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Clinical trials (epidemiology), Informed consent, Research and publication ethics, Legal and forensic medicine]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[A randomised controlled trial to compare opt-in and opt-out parental consent for childhood vaccine safety surveillance using data linkage]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-04-19</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Research ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2012-100560v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Attitude towards plagiarism among Iranian medical students]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2012-100560v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>In recent years, scientific misconduct has received significant attention within the scientific community. Plagiarism is the most frequent type of scientific misconduct and is defined as &lsquo;unauthorised appropriation of another's work, ideas, methods, results or words without acknowledging the source and original author&rsquo;.<cross-ref type="bib" refid="b1">1</cross-ref> <cross-ref type="bib" refid="b2">2</cross-ref></p><p>Although medical students all over the world conduct research and write papers, the level of knowledge and attitudes of undergraduate and graduate medical students in developing countries towards the importance and consequences of plagiarism remain unclear.</p><p>In this study conducted between August and October 2011, we assessed the attitude of the students of Tehran University of Medical Sciences towards plagiarism.</p><p>Seventy undergraduate students (by simple random selection) were selected for a pilot phase of the study. Twenty participants were asked to re-answer the questionnaire after 2&nbsp;weeks. Two hundred and thirty cases were selected by stratified random sampling method regarding different strata (clerkship: 3rd to 6th...]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ghajarzadeh, M., Hassanpour, K., Fereshtehnejad, S.-M., Jamali, A., Nedjat, S., Aramesh, K.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-04-13T02:02:53-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2012-100560</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2012-100560</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Cardiovascular medicine, Competing interests (ethics), Research and publication ethics, Undergraduate, Education, medical]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Attitude towards plagiarism among Iranian medical students]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-04-13</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Ethics abstract</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100419v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Reply to Marquis: how things stand with the 'future like ours' argument]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100419v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>In an earlier essay in this journal I critiqued Don Marquis's well-known argument against abortion. I distinguished two versions of Marquis's argument, which I refer to as &lsquo;the essence argument&rsquo; and &lsquo;the sufficient condition argument&rsquo;. I presented two counterexamples showing that the essence argument was mistaken, and I argued that the sufficient condition argument should be rejected because Marquis had not adequately responded to an important objection to it. In response to my critique, Marquis put forward in this journal a revised version of his argument. In his modified approach he no longer advocates the essence argument and he offers a new version of the sufficient condition argument. In the current essay, I discuss how Marquis's revised argument deals with my original objections, and I argue that his new sufficient condition argument is unsuccessful.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Strong, C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-04-13T02:03:58-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100419</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100419</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Ethics of abortion, Ethics of reproduction, Sex and sexuality]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Reply to Marquis: how things stand with the 'future like ours' argument]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-04-13</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Response</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100411v3?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100411v3?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Abortion is largely accepted even for reasons that do not have anything to do with the fetus' health. By showing that (1) both fetuses and newborns do not have the same moral status as actual persons, (2) the fact that both are potential persons is morally irrelevant and (3) adoption is not always in the best interest of actual people, the authors argue that what we call &lsquo;after-birth abortion&rsquo; (killing a newborn) should be permissible in all the cases where abortion is, including cases where the newborn is not disabled.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Giubilini, A., Minerva, F.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-04-13T02:03:06-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100411</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100411</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Cardiovascular medicine, Molecular genetics, Child health, Disability, Screening (epidemiology), Ethics of abortion, Ethics of reproduction, Sex and sexuality, Screening (public health)]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-04-13</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Law, ethics and medicine</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100361v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Knowledge, attitude and practices regarding the status of 'animal ingredients in medicines' among medical professionals in a tertiary care hospital in Mumbai: a cross-sectional survey]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100361v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<sec><st>Introduction and objectives</st><p>Doctors generally do not discuss the way drugs are manufactured, the source of raw materials and the process of labelling, packing and transport of the drugs for the use of consumers.</p><p>A close scrutiny of the process of manufacturing medicinal drugs and chemicals reveals that a significant number of drugs contain animal ingredients (either directly or indirectly).</p><p>This research was designed to address the following questions:<l type="ord"><li><p>Current level of physician knowledge about animal ingredients in medicine and the existing rules and regulations about the same.</p></li><li><p>The assumptions and attitudes held by physicians about animal ingredients in medicines.</p></li><li><p>Current practices with respect to the use of medicines containing animal ingredients.</p></li></l></p></sec><sec><st>Design</st><p>We conducted a cross-sectional survey using self-administered questionnaires distributed to 250 medical professionals.</p></sec><sec><st>Results</st><p>Of 250 participants, 185 (74%) completed the questionnaire.</p><p>Regarding the presence of animal ingredients in medicines, 77% were aware of their presence, while 23% were unaware. Seventy-four per cent thought it was important...]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jain, M. M., Thakkar, K.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-04-13T02:02:53-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100361</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100361</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Competing interests (ethics), Research and publication ethics]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Knowledge, attitude and practices regarding the status of 'animal ingredients in medicines' among medical professionals in a tertiary care hospital in Mumbai: a cross-sectional survey]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-04-13</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Ethics abstract</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100448v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Genomic sovereignty and the African promise: mining the African genome for the benefit of Africa]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100448v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Scientific interest in genomics in Africa is on the rise with a number of funding initiatives aimed specifically at supporting research in this area. Genomics research on material of African origin raises a number of important ethical issues. A prominent concern relates to sample export, which is increasingly seen by researchers and ethics committees across the continent as being problematic. The concept of genomic sovereignty proposes that unique patterns of genomic variation can be found in human populations, and that these are commercially, scientifically or symbolically valuable and in need of protection against exploitation. Although it is appealing as a response to increasing concerns regarding sample export, there are a number of important conceptual problems relating to the term. It is not clear, for instance, whether it is appropriate that ownership over human genomic samples should rest with national governments. Furthermore, ethnic groups in Africa are frequently spread across multiple nation states, and protection offered in one state may not prevent researchers from accessing the same group elsewhere. Lastly, scientific evidence suggests that the assumption that genomic data is unique for population groups is false. Although the frequency with which particular variants are found can differ between groups, such genes or variants per se are not unique to any population group. In this paper, the authors describe these concerns in detail and argue that the concept of genomic sovereignty alone may not be adequate to protect the genetic resources of people of African descent.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[de Vries, J., Pepper, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-04-06T02:01:27-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100448</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100448</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Health policy, Research and publication ethics, Health service research]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Genomic sovereignty and the African promise: mining the African genome for the benefit of Africa]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-04-06</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Genetics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100159v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Ethical issues raised by the introduction of payment for performance in France]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100159v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<sec><st>Context</st><p>In France, a new payment for performance (P4P) scheme for primary care physicians was introduced in 2009 through the &lsquo;Contract for Improving Individual Practice&rsquo; programme. Its objective was to reduce healthcare expenditures while enhancing improvement in guidelines' observance. Nevertheless, in all countries where the scheme was implemented, it raised several concerns in the domain of professional ethics.</p></sec><sec><st>Objective</st><p>To draw out in France the ethical tensions arising in the general practitioner's (GP) profession linked to the introduction of P4P.</p></sec><sec><st>Method</st><p>Qualitative research using two focus groups: first one with a sample of GPs who joined P4P and second one with those who did not. All collective interviews were recorded and fully transcribed. An inductive analysis of thematic content with construction of categories was conducted. All the data were triangulated.</p></sec><sec><st>Results</st><p>All participants agreed that conflicts of interest were a real issue, leading to the resurgence of doctor's dirigisme, which could be detrimental for patient's autonomy. GPs who did not join P4P believed that the scheme would lead to patient's selection while those who joined P4P did not. The level of the maximal bonus of the P4P was considered low by all GPs. This was considered as an offense by non-participating GPs, whereas for participating ones, this low level minimised the risk of patient's selection.</p></sec><sec><st>Conclusion</st><p>This work identified several areas of ethical tension, some being different from those previously described in other countries. The authors discuss the potential impact of institutional contexts and variability of implementation processes on shaping these differences.</p></sec>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Saint-Lary, O., Plu, I., Naiditch, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-04-06T02:01:26-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100159</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100159</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Health policy, Unlocked, General practice / family medicine, Screening (epidemiology), Competing interests (ethics), Health economics, Health service research, Screening (public health)]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Ethical issues raised by the introduction of payment for performance in France]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-04-06</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Law, ethics and medicine</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100228v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[It is the lifetime that matters: public preferences over maximising health and reducing inequalities in health]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100228v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Scarce healthcare resources can be allocated in many ways. The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence in the UK focuses on the size of the benefit relative to costs, yet we know that there is support among clinicians and the general public for reducing inequalities in health. This paper shows how the UK general public trade-off these sometimes competing objectives, and the data we gather allow us to show the weight given to different population groups, for example, 1 extra year of life in full health to someone who would otherwise die at the age of 60 years is worth more than twice as much as an additional year of life to someone who would otherwise die at the age of 70 years. Such data can help inform the rationing decisions faced by all healthcare systems around the world.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Dolan, P., Tsuchiya, A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-04-06T02:01:26-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100228</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100228</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Health policy, Health service research]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[It is the lifetime that matters: public preferences over maximising health and reducing inequalities in health]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-04-06</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Brief report</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100154v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[An analysis of US fertility centre educational materials suggests that informed consent for preimplantation genetic diagnosis may be inadequate]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100154v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) has expanded both in number and scope over the past 2&nbsp;decades. Initially carried out to avoid the birth of children with severe genetic disease, PGD is now used for a variety of medical and non-medical purposes. While some human studies have concluded that PGD is safe, animal studies and a recent human study suggest that the embryo biopsy procedure may result in neurological problems for the offspring. Given that the long-term safety of PGD has not been clearly established in humans, this study sought to determine how PGD safety is presented to prospective patients by means of a detailed website analysis. The websites of 262 US fertility centres performing PGD were analysed and comments about safety and risk were catalogued. Results of the analysis demonstrated that 78.2% of centre websites did not mention safety or risk of PGD at all. Of the 21.8% of centres that did contain safety or risk information about PGD, 28.1% included statements highlighting the potential risks, 38.6% presented information touting the procedure as safe and 33.3% included statements highlighting potential risks and the overall safety of the procedure. Thus, 86.6% of PGD-performing centres state that PGD is safe and/or fail to disclose any risks on their websites despite the fact that the impact of the procedure on the long-term health of offspring is unproven. This lack of disclosure suggests that informed consent is inadequate; this study examines numerous factors that are likely to inhibit comprehensive discussions of safety.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[LaBonte, M. L.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-04-06T02:01:26-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100154</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100154</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Clinical genetics, Genetic screening / counselling, Clinical diagnostic tests, Screening (epidemiology), Ethics of reproduction, Informed consent, Legal and forensic medicine, Screening (public health)]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[An analysis of US fertility centre educational materials suggests that informed consent for preimplantation genetic diagnosis may be inadequate]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-04-06</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Genetics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100044v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The burden of normality: from 'chronically ill' to 'symptom free'. New ethical challenges for deep brain stimulation postoperative treatment]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100044v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Although an invasive medical intervention, Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) has been regarded as an efficient and safe treatment of Parkinson's disease for the last 20&nbsp;years. In terms of clinical ethics, it is worth asking whether the use of DBS may have unanticipated negative effects similar to those associated with other types of psychosurgery. Clinical studies of epileptic patients who have undergone an anterior temporal lobectomy have identified a range of side effects and complications in a number of domains: psychological, behavioural, affective and social. In many cases, patients express difficulty adjusting from being chronically ill to their new status as &lsquo;treated&rsquo; or &lsquo;seizure free&rsquo;. This postoperative response adjustment has been described in the literature on epilepsy as the &lsquo;Burden of Normality&rsquo; (BoN) syndrome. Most of the discussion about DBS postoperative changes to self is focused on abnormal side effects caused by the intervention (ie, hypersexuality, hypomania, etc). By contrast, relatively little attention is paid to the idea that successfully &lsquo;treated&rsquo; individuals might experience difficulties in adjusting to becoming &lsquo;normal&rsquo;. The purpose of this paper is (1) to articulate the postoperative DBS psychosocial adjustment process in terms of the BoN syndrome, (2) to address whether the BoN syndrome illustrates that DBS treatment poses a threat to the patient's identity, and (3) to examine whether the current framework for rehabilitation after DBS procedures should be updated and take into account the BoN syndrome as a postoperative self-change response.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Gilbert, F.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-03-19T02:01:27-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100044</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100044</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Cardiovascular medicine, Clinical ethics, Research and publication ethics]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The burden of normality: from 'chronically ill' to 'symptom free'. New ethical challenges for deep brain stimulation postoperative treatment]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-03-19</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Clinical ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100256v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Constraining the use of antibiotics: applying Scanlon's contractualism]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100256v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Decisions to use antibiotics require that patient interests are balanced against the public good, that is, control of antibiotic resistance. Patients carry the risks of suboptimal antibiotic treatment and many physicians are reluctant to impose even small avoidable risks on patients. At the same time, antibiotics are overused and antibiotic-resistant microbes are contributing an increasing burden of adverse patient outcomes. It is the criteria that we can use to reject the use of antibiotics that is the focus of this paper. Scanlon's contractualism explains why antibiotics should not be used to gain small benefits, even when the direct costs of antibiotics are low. We know that some individuals now (and probably more in the future will) carry a burden of irretrievable harm as a consequence of treatment- (antibiotic-) resistant infection. If we accept that the dominant justification for use of antibiotics is to prevent irretrievable harm to an individual or contact, then the use of antibiotics for self-limiting conditions, or for the treatment of individuals with conditions for which antibiotics do not substantially impact on outcomes (eg, in the latter stages of terminal illness), or for access based on preference or willingness to pay (internet or over-the-counter access), or the use of antibiotics as animal growth promoters can be rejected. Scanlon's approach also suggests that, with few new antibiotics in the pipeline and an increasing burden of disease attributable to resistant microbes, control of the spread of antibiotic-resistant microbes should be given increasing priority.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Millar, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-03-19T02:01:26-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100256</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100256</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Molecular genetics]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Constraining the use of antibiotics: applying Scanlon's contractualism]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-03-19</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Clinical ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100264v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Widening the debate about conflict of interest: addressing relationships between journalists and the pharmaceutical industry]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100264v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The phone-hacking scandal that led to the closure of the <I>News of the World</I> newspaper in Britain has prompted international debate about media practices and regulation. It is timely to broaden the discussion about journalistic ethics and conduct to include consideration of the impact of media practices upon the population's health. Many commercial organisations cultivate relationships with journalists and news organisations with the aim of influencing the content of health-related news and information communicated through the media. Given the significant influence of the media on the health of individuals and populations, we should be alert to the potential impact of industry&ndash;journalist relationships on health care, health policy and public health. The approach taken by the medical profession to its interactions with the pharmaceutical industry provides a useful model for management of industry influence.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lipworth, W., Kerridge, I., Sweet, M., Jordens, C., Bonfiglioli, C., Forsyth, R.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-03-19T02:01:26-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100264</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100264</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Competing interests (ethics), Human rights]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Widening the debate about conflict of interest: addressing relationships between journalists and the pharmaceutical industry]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-03-19</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Public health ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100379v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The rights and wrongs of intentional exposure research: contextualising the Guatemala STD inoculation study]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100379v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>In its recent review of the US Public Health Service Sexually Transmitted Disease Inoculation Study, conducted in Guatemala from 1946 to 1948, the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues identified a number of egregious ethical violations, but failed to adequately address issues associated with the intentional exposure research design in particular. As a result, a common public misconception that the study was wrong because researchers purposefully infected their subjects has been left standing. In fact, human subjects have been exposed to disease pathogens for experimental purposes for centuries, and this study design remains an important scientific tool today. It shares key features with other types of widely accepted research on human subjects and can be conducted ethically, provided certain safeguards are implemented. That these safeguards were not implemented in Guatemala is what made that study wrong, rather than the fact of intentional exposure itself. To preserve public trust in the clinical research enterprise, this conclusion ought to be stated explicitly and emphasised.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lynch, H. F.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-03-19T02:01:26-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100379</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100379</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Sexual health, Bioethics, Informed consent, Legal and forensic medicine]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The rights and wrongs of intentional exposure research: contextualising the Guatemala STD inoculation study]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-03-19</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Brief report</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100301v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Closing the translation gap for justice requirements in international research]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100301v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Bioethicists have long debated the content of sponsors and researchers' obligations of justice in international clinical research. However, there has been little empirical investigation as to whether and how obligations of responsiveness, ancillary care, post-trial benefits and research capacity strengthening are upheld in low- and middle-income country settings. In this paper, the authors argue that research ethics guidelines need to be more informed by international research practice. Practical guidance on how to fulfil these obligations is needed if research groups and other actors are to successfully translate them into practice because doing so is often a complicated, context-specific process. Case study research methods offer one avenue for collecting data to develop this guidance. The authors describe how such methods have been used in relation to the Shoklo Malaria Research Unit's vivax malaria treatment (VHX) trial (NCT01074905). Relying on the VHX trial example, the paper shows how information can be gathered from not only international clinical researchers but also trial participants, community advisory board members and research funder representatives in order to: (1) measure evidence of responsiveness, provision of ancillary care, access to post-trial benefits and research capacity strengthening in international clinical research; and (2) identify the contextual factors and roles and responsibilities that were instrumental in the fulfilment of these ethical obligations. Such empirical work is necessary to inform the articulation of obligations of justice in international research and to develop guidance on how to fulfil them in order to facilitate better adherence to guidelines' requirements.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Pratt, B., Zion, D., Lwin, K. M., Cheah, P. Y., Nosten, F., Loff, B.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-03-16T02:01:22-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100301</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100301</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Research and publication ethics]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Closing the translation gap for justice requirements in international research]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-03-16</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Research ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100426v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Forced to be Right]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100426v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>In "Forced to be Free", Neil Levy surveys the raft of documented decision-making biases that humans are heir to, and advances several bold proposals designed to enhance the patient's judgment. Gratefully, Levy is moved by the psychological research on judgment and decision-making that documents people's inaccuracy when identifying courses of action will best promote their subjective well-being. But Levy is quick to favour the patient's present preferences, to ensure they get "final say" about their treatment. I urge the opposite inclination, raising doubts about whether the patient's "present preferences" are the best expression of their "final say". When there is adequate evidence that people, by their own lights, overemphasize their present preferences about the future, we should carefully depreciate those preferences, in effect biasing them to make the right decision by their own lights.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Trout, J. D.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-03-13T02:02:12-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100426</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100426</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Forced to be Right]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-03-13</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Commentary</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2012-100505v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Titmuss revisited: from tax credits to markets]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2012-100505v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Petersen and Lippert-Rasmussen argue that persons who decide to be organ donors should receive a tax break, and then defend their view against eight possible objections. However, they misunderstand the Titmuss-style concerns that might be raised against their proposal. This does not mean that it should be rejected, but, instead, that when it is reconfigured to meet the Titmuss-style charges against it, they should support legalizing markets in human organs rather than merely offering tax breaks to encourage their donation.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Taylor, J. S.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-03-12T01:02:23-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2012-100505</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2012-100505</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Titmuss revisited: from tax credits to markets]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-03-12</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Commentary</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100113v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Turning residual human biological materials into research collections: playing with consent]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100113v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>This article focuses on three scenarios in which residual biological materials are turned into research collections during the procedure of procuring these materials for diagnostic, therapeutic or other non-research purposes. These three scenarios differ from each other primarily because they employ different models of consent: (a) precautionary consent, which may be secured during the collecting procedure; (b) the presumed consent model, which may be applied during the collection of materials; and (c) consent for research use of identifiable human biological materials, which may be skipped entirely. These scenarios offer additional sources of biological samples for research purposes and at the same time seem to offer even more flexibility in terms of stringency of consent as compared with the more traditional models of broad consent in prospective research collections and the waiver of consent in retrospective research. Our discussion leads us to think that precautionary consent is preferable to presumed consent and no consent when handling issues of consent in the use of residual human biological materials for research. However, such precautionary consent should not be construed as blanket, unrestricted consent for any future use.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Gefenas, E., Dranseika, V., Serepkaite, J., Cekanauskaite, A., Caenazzo, L., Gordijn, B., Pegoraro, R., Yuko, E.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-03-09T02:01:23-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100113</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100113</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Cardiovascular medicine, Research and publication ethics]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Turning residual human biological materials into research collections: playing with consent]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-03-09</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Research ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100055v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Predictive genetic testing in minors for late-onset conditions: a chronological and analytical review of the ethical arguments]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100055v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Predictive genetic testing is now routinely offered to asymptomatic adults at risk for genetic disease. However, testing of minors at risk for adult-onset conditions, where no treatment or preventive intervention exists, has evoked greater controversy and inspired a debate spanning two decades. This review aims to provide a detailed longitudinal analysis and concludes by examining the debate's current status and prospects for the future. Fifty-three relevant theoretical papers published between 1990 and December 2010 were identified, and interpretative content analysis was employed to catalogue discrete arguments within these papers. Novel conclusions were drawn from this review. While the debate's first voices were raised in opposition of testing and their arguments have retained currency over many years, arguments in favour of testing, which appeared sporadically at first, have gained momentum more recently. Most arguments on both sides are testable empirical claims, so far untested, rather than abstract ethical or philosophical positions. The dispute, therein, lies not so much in whether minors should be permitted to access predictive genetic testing but whether these empirical claims on the relative benefits or harms of testing should be assessed.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mand, C., Gillam, L., Delatycki, M. B., Duncan, R. E.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-03-08T02:01:14-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100055</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100055</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Oncology, Clinical genetics]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Predictive genetic testing in minors for late-onset conditions: a chronological and analytical review of the ethical arguments]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-03-08</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Feature article</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100208v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Informed consent for record linkage: a systematic review]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100208v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<sec><st>Background</st><p>Record linkage is a useful tool for health research. Potential benefits aside, its use raises discussions on privacy issues, such as whether a written informed consent for access to health records and linkage should be obtained. The authors aim to systematically review studies that assess consent proportions to record linkage.</p></sec><sec><st>Methods</st><p>8 databases were searched up to June 2011 to find articles which presented consent proportions to record linkage. The screening, eligibility and inclusion of articles were conducted by two independent reviewers. The authors carried out meta-regression, subgroup and sensitivity analyses to assess heterogeneity.</p></sec><sec><st>Results</st><p>Of the 141 studies identified, only 11 presented empirical consent proportions and were included in the systematic review. The consent proportion varied widely from 39% to 97%. Seven studies presented consent proportions of 88% or higher, one of 72%, and only three presented consented proportion equal to or lower than 53%. None of the studies' characteristics evaluated explained heterogeneity.</p></sec><sec><st>Conclusion</st><p>The results of this review show that, in general, individuals tend to consent to the use of their data for record linkage, with exceptions in specific populations or minorities. The authors believe that this, as well as the cited literature, lends support to policies that, while keeping relevant ethical controls in place, do not require individual informed consent for each and every study that relies on secondary data.</p></sec>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Marinho da Silva, M. E., Coeli, C. M., Ventura, M., Palacios, M., Magnanini, M. M. F., Camargo, T. M. C. R., Camargo, K. R.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-03-08T02:01:14-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100208</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100208</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Screening (epidemiology), Informed consent, Legal and forensic medicine, Human rights, Screening (public health)]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Informed consent for record linkage: a systematic review]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-03-08</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Brief report</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100085v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Liberty or death; don't tread on me]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100085v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Many jurisdictions require cyclists to wear bicycle helmets. The UK is currently not one of these. However, an increasing number of interest groups, including the British Medical Association, want to change the status quo. They argue that mandatory cycle helmet laws will reduce the incidence of head injuries and that this will be both good for cyclists (because they will suffer fewer head injuries) and good for society (because the burden of having to treat cyclists suffering from head injuries will be reduced). In this paper we argue against this position. We suggest that cycle helmets may not be especially effective in reducing head injuries and we suggest that the imposition of such a restrictive law would violate people's freedom and reduce their autonomy. We also argue that those who accept such a restrictive law would be committed to supporting further legislation which would force many other groups &ndash; including pedestrians &ndash; to take fewer risks with their health. We conclude that cycle helmet legislation should not be enacted in the UK unless, perhaps, it is restricted to children.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hooper, C., Spicer, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-03-07T16:30:52-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100085</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100085</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Cardiovascular medicine, Press releases]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Liberty or death; don't tread on me]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-03-07</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Law, ethics and medicine</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2012-100501v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Tax needn't be taxing, but in the case of organ donation it might be]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2012-100501v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Petersen and Lippert-Rasmussen argue that, while a tax credit scheme to encourage organ donation would be costly, the increased number of organs for transplantation would lead to other savings in the healthcare system. In the present work some calculations are provided and it is suggested that, even given optimistic assumptions, the cost to the state of implementing the system as proposed would be high and unlikely to garner the support of politicians and policymakers.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Quigley, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-03-06T02:01:41-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2012-100501</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2012-100501</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Tax needn't be taxing, but in the case of organ donation it might be]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-03-06</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Commentary</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100273v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Individual genetic and genomic research results and the tradition of informed consent: exploring US review board guidance]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100273v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<sec><st>Background</st><p>Genomic research is challenging the tradition of informed consent. Genomic researchers in the USA, Canada and parts of Europe are encouraged to use informed consent to address the prospect of disclosing individual research results (IRRs) to study participants. In the USA, no national policy exists to direct this use of informed consent, and it is unclear how local institutional review boards (IRBs) may want researchers to respond.</p></sec><sec><st>Objective and methods</st><p>To explore publicly accessible IRB websites for guidance in this area, using summative content analysis.</p></sec><sec><st>Findings</st><p>Three types of research results were addressed in 45 informed consent templates and instructions from 20 IRBs based at centres conducting genomic research: (1) IRRs in general, (2) incidental findings (IFs) and (3) a broad and unspecified category of &lsquo;significant new findings&rsquo; (SNFs). IRRs were more frequently referenced than IFs or SNFs. Most documents stated that access to IRRs would <I>not</I> be an option for research participants. These non-disclosure statements were found to coexist in some documents with statements that SNFs <I>would</I> be disclosed to participants if related to their willingness to participate in research. The median readability of template language on IRRs, IFs and SNFs exceeded a ninth-grade level.</p></sec><sec><st>Conclusion</st><p>IRB guidance may downplay the possibility of IFs and contain conflicting messages on IRR non-disclosure and SNF disclosure. IRBs may need to clarify why separate IRR and SNF language should appear in the same consent document. The extent of these issues, nationally and internationally, needs to be determined.</p></sec>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Simon, C., Shinkunas, L. A., Brandt, D., Williams, J. K.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-02-23T02:01:36-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100273</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100273</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Health policy, Informed consent, Health service research, Legal and forensic medicine, Human rights]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Individual genetic and genomic research results and the tradition of informed consent: exploring US review board guidance]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-03-05</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Research ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2012-100542v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Fatal fetal paternalism]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2012-100542v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Heuser and colleagues' survey of obstetricians provides a valuable insight into the current management of severe fetal anomalies in the United States. Their survey reveals two striking features - that counselling for these anomalies is far from neutral, and that there is significant variability between clinicians in their approach to management. In this commentary I outline the reasons to be concerned about both of these. Directiveness in counselling arguably represents a form of paternalism, and the evident variability in practice is likely the result of physician personal values. However, Heuser's survey may, by shining a light on practice, provide an important step towards a more consistent approach.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Wilkinson, D.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-02-28T02:02:55-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2012-100542</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2012-100542</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Fatal fetal paternalism]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-02-28</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Commentary</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100373v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[How family caregivers' medical and moral assumptions influence decision making for patients in the vegetative state: a qualitative interview study]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100373v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<sec><st>Background</st><p>Decisions on limiting life-sustaining treatment for patients in the vegetative state (VS) are emotionally and morally challenging. In Germany, doctors have to discuss, together with the legal surrogate (often a family member), whether the proposed treatment is in accordance with the patient's will. However, it is unknown whether family members of the patient in the VS actually base their decisions on the patient's wishes.</p></sec><sec><st>Objective</st><p>To examine the role of advance directives, orally expressed wishes, or the presumed will of patients in a VS for family caregivers' decisions on life-sustaining treatment.</p></sec><sec><st>Methods and sample</st><p>A qualitative interview study with 14 next of kin of patients in a VS in a long-term care setting was conducted; 13 participants were the patient's legal surrogates. Interviews were analysed according to qualitative content analysis.</p></sec><sec><st>Results</st><p>The majority of family caregivers said that they were aware of aforementioned wishes of the patient that could be applied to the VS condition, but did not base their decisions primarily on these wishes. They gave three reasons for this: (a) the expectation of clinical improvement, (b) the caregivers' definition of life-sustaining treatments and (c) the moral obligation not to harm the patient. If the patient's wishes were not known or not revealed, the caregivers interpreted a will to live into the patient's survival and non-verbal behaviour.</p></sec><sec><st>Conclusions</st><p>Whether or not prior treatment wishes of patients in a VS are respected depends on their applicability, and also on the medical assumptions and moral attitudes of the surrogates. We recommend repeated communication, support for the caregivers and advance care planning.</p></sec>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kuehlmeyer, K., Borasio, G. D., Jox, R. J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-02-28T06:10:53-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100373</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100373</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Unlocked, Press releases, Psychology and medicine]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[How family caregivers' medical and moral assumptions influence decision making for patients in the vegetative state: a qualitative interview study]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-02-28</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Clinical ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100099v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[How to depolarise the ethical debate over human embryonic stem cell research (and other ethical debates too!)]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100099v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The contention of this paper is that the current ethical debate over embryonic stem cell research is polarised to an extent that is not warranted by the underlying ethical conflict. It is argued that the ethical debate can be rendered more nuanced, and less polarised, by introducing non-binary notions of moral rightness and wrongness. According to the view proposed, embryonic stem cell research&mdash;and possibly other controversial activities too&mdash;can be considered &lsquo;a little bit right and a little bit wrong&rsquo;. If this idea were to become widely accepted, the ethical debate would, for conceptual reasons, become less polarised.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Espinoza, N., Peterson, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-02-28T02:02:55-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100099</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100099</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Ethics of reproduction, Research and publication ethics]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[How to depolarise the ethical debate over human embryonic stem cell research (and other ethical debates too!)]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-02-28</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Research ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100268v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Mahatma Gandhi's view on euthanasia and assisted suicide]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100268v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>To many in India and elsewhere, the life and thoughts of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi are a source of inspiration. The idea of non-violence was pivotal in his thinking. In this context, Gandhi reflected upon the possibility of what is now called &lsquo;euthanasia&rsquo; and &lsquo;assisted suicide&rsquo;. So far, his views on these practices have not been properly studied. In his reflections on euthanasia and assisted suicide, Gandhi shows himself to be a contextually flexible thinker. In spite of being a staunch defender of non-violence, Gandhi was aware that violence may sometimes be unavoidable. Under certain conditions, killing a living being could even be an expression of non-violence. He argued that in a few rare cases it may be better to kill people who are suffering unbearably at the end of life. In this way, he seems to support euthanasia and assisted suicide. Yet, Gandhi also thought that as long as care can be extended to a dying patient, his or her suffering could be relieved. Since in most cases relief was thus possible, euthanasia and assisted suicide were in fact redundant. By stressing the importance of care and nursing as an alternative to euthanasia and assisted suicide, Gandhi unconsciously made himself an early advocate of palliative care in India. This observation could be used to strengthen and promote the further development of palliative care in India.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Gielen, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-02-28T02:02:55-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100268</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100268</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Oncology, End of life decisions (geriatric medicine), End of life decisions (palliative care), Hospice, Suicide (psychiatry), Assisted dying, End of life decisions (ethics), Suicide (public health)]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Mahatma Gandhi's view on euthanasia and assisted suicide]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-02-28</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Global medical ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100020v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Terminating clinical trials without sufficient subjects]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100020v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Medical research involving human subjects can be risky and burdensome. Therefore, such research must be reviewed and approved by a Research Ethics Committee (REC). To guarantee the safety of the subjects, it is very important that these studies be conducted in accordance with the approved protocol. An important issue in this respect is whether studies include the requisite number of subjects based on the research question. The research question is unlikely to be answered reliably if the requisite number of subjects is not met. In such cases, subjects are exposed to unnecessary risks and burdens. In this descriptive study, the authors evaluated how frequently studies are completed with the required number of subjects. Moreover, the authors identified the characteristics of research that does and does not include the required number of subjects. The results of this study show that a considerable proportion of studies (<unl>41</unl>/107) were terminated although they failed to recruit a sufficient number of subjects. Furthermore, the authors found that investigator-initiated studies have significantly (p=0.028) more problems in recruiting the requisite number of subjects than studies initiated by pharmaceutical companies. Potential solutions are discussed to reduce the number of studies that do not include a sufficient number of subjects.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Damen, L., van Agt, F., de Boo, T., Huysmans, F.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-02-28T02:02:55-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100020</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100020</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Research and publication ethics]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Terminating clinical trials without sufficient subjects]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-02-28</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Research ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100217v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Postmortem brain donation and organ transplantation in schizophrenia: what about patient consent?]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100217v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>In patients with schizophrenia, consent postmortem for organ donation for transplantation and research is usually obtained from relatives. By means of a questionnaire, the authors investigate whether patients with schizophrenia would agree to family members making such decisions for them as well as compare decisions regarding postmortem organ transplantation and brain donation between patients and significant family members. Study results indicate while most patients would not agree to transplantation or brain donation for research, a proportion would agree. Among patients who declined organ donation for transplantation or brain research, almost half of family members would have agreed to brain donation for research and over 40% to organ transplantation. Male relatives are more likely to agree to organ donation from their deceased relatives for both transplantation and research. The authors argue that it is important to respect autonomy and interests of research subjects even if mentally ill and even if no longer living. Consent may be assisted by appropriate educational interventions prior to patient death.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Strous, R. D., Bergman-Levy, T., Greenberg, B.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-02-25T02:01:10-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100217</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100217</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Cardiovascular medicine, Transplantation, Artificial and donated transplantation, Informed consent, Legal and forensic medicine, Psychology and medicine]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Postmortem brain donation and organ transplantation in schizophrenia: what about patient consent?]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-02-25</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Brief report</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100194v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Is there an objective way to compare research risks?]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100194v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Determining whether a research risk meets or exceeds a regulatory standard of risk acceptability is difficult. Recently a framework called the systematic evaluation of research risks (SERR) has been proposed as a method of comparing research risks with predetermined standards of acceptability. SERR purports to offer a systematic and largely determinate (definite) way to compare risks and say whether a specific research risk falls below or above an acknowledged standard of acceptable risk. Here the authors review some philosophical problems with this framework, which they take to be representative of determinate approaches to risk comparison, and conclude that it should not be used in a stand-alone or determinate fashion. Instead, the authors suggest that a deliberative approach may be a more viable candidate for future development. Such an approach could be informed by methods such as SERR without being rigidly bound to them.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rossi, J., Nelson, R. M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-02-25T02:01:10-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100194</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100194</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Clinical diagnostic tests]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Is there an objective way to compare research risks?]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-02-25</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Research ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100420v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[What do we really know about the deliberate use of placebos in clinical practice?]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100420v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The aim of the present study was to explore the use and understanding of the concepts &lsquo;placebo&rsquo; and &lsquo;placebo effect&rsquo; in 12 empirical studies that have addressed the prescription of placebos by doctors in clinical practice. There were great differences in the general methodology and in the definitions (or lack of any definition) of the basic concepts in these 12 studies. Therefore, the results reflect different things. They tell us a little about the use of &lsquo;pure placebos&rsquo;, more about the use of &lsquo;impure placebos&rsquo;, but most of all, they tell us about the conceptual confusion in this area.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Louhiala, P.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-02-19T02:01:18-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100420</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100420</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Pain (neurology), Pain (palliative care), Pain (anaesthesia)]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[What do we really know about the deliberate use of placebos in clinical practice?]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-02-19</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Clinical ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100057v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Bioethics in the public square: reflections on the how]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100057v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>As bioethics gains more prominence in public policy debates, it is time to more fully reflect on the following: what is its role in the public square, and what limitations relate to and barriers impede its fulfilment of this role? I contend we should consider the <I>how</I> of bioethics (as a policy influencer) rather than simply focus on the <I>who</I> or <I>what</I> of bioethical enquiry. This is not to suggest considerations of latter categories are not important, only that too little attention has been paid to parallel or resulting policy involvement&mdash;involvement that will require specialised skills and knowledge that we can develop with a proactive (vs reactive) stance. Moreover, and equally critically, this <I>how</I> of public policy involvement will require more transparency regarding influences (eg, philosophical, ideological, cultural, socio-political) on what bioethicists bring to the table and what constituency base each represents&mdash;a humility as to the scope of one's role. In this vision, bioethics is not one single person or belief system for a policymaker to call to guide or give support to a position; rather, it offers tools&mdash;formed and utilised by a diverse disciplinary range of individuals&mdash;to help guide ethical analysis of biomedical endeavours, with the goal of infusion and diffusion of ethical enquiry and prioritisation in health policymaking, and greater humility among bioethicists who inform this discussion.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Campbell, A. T.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-02-19T02:01:17-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100057</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100057</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Bioethics, Ethics of reproduction, Research and publication ethics]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Bioethics in the public square: reflections on the how]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-02-19</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Brief report</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100123v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Ethical approval in developing countries is not optional]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100123v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>When conducting health and medical research it is important to do the research ethically and to apply for prior ethical approval from the relevant authorities. The latter requirement is true for developed countries as well as developing countries. The authors argue that simply applying for research ethics approval from an institutional review board at a university based in a developed country is not enough to start a health research project in a developing country. The paper also suggests a number of reasons why researchers may fail to seek local research ethics permission in developing countries. The authors use a recent paper reporting research conducted in Nepal and published in an international journal as a case study to highlight the importance of being sensitive to local requirements regarding applying for and registering health and medical research.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[van Teijlingen, E. R., Simkhada, P. P.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-02-16T02:01:21-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100123</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100123</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Research and publication ethics]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Ethical approval in developing countries is not optional]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-02-16</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Global medical ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100294v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The ethics of attaching research conditions to access to new health technologies]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100294v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Decisions on which new health technologies to provide are controversial because of the scarcity of healthcare resources, the competing demands of payers, providers and patients and the uncertainty of the evidence base. Given this, additional information about new health technologies is often considered valuable. One response is to make access to a new health technology conditional on further research. Access can be restricted to patients who participate in a research study, such as a randomised controlled trial; alternatively, a new treatment can be made generally available, but only on condition that further evidence is collected (eg, on long-term outcomes and adverse events, in patient registries). The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), which provides guidance on which new health technologies to make available under the UK's NHS, for example, has made some research conditional recommendations, and the current interest in such options suggests that they are likely to become more prevalent in the future. This paper identifies and discusses the main ethical issues created by this distinctive range of recommendations. We argue that decisions to put research conditions on access to new technologies are compatible with widely accepted values, principles and practices relevant to resource allocation. However, there are important features of these distinctive judgements that must be taken into account by resource allocation decision-making bodies and research ethics committees, and that require new sorts of empirical data.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Holland, S., Hope, T.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-02-16T02:00:53-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100294</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100294</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Clinical trials (epidemiology), Research and publication ethics]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The ethics of attaching research conditions to access to new health technologies]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-02-16</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Current controversy</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2012-100492v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Why autonomy needs help]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2012-100492v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Some argue that to be effective in healthcare settings autonomy needs to be strengthened. The author thinks autonomy is fundamentally inadequate in healthcare settings and requires supplementation by experience-based paternalism on the part of doctors and healthcare providers.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Caplan, A. L.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-02-15T02:01:33-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2012-100492</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2012-100492</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Why autonomy needs help]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-02-15</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Commentary</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2012-100491v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Responsibly counselling women about the clinical management of pregnancies complicated by severe fetal anomalies]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2012-100491v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Heuser, Eller and Byrne provide important descriptive ethics data about how physicians counsel women on the clinical management of pregnancies complicated by severe fetal anomalies. The authors present an account of what such counselling ought to be based on, the ethical concept of the fetus as a patient and the professional responsibility model of obstetric ethics. When there is certainty about the diagnosis and either a very high probability of either death as the outcome of the anomaly or survival with severe and irreversible deficit of cognitive developmental capacity as a result of the anomaly diagnosed, the pregnant woman should be offered the alternatives of aggressive and non-aggressive obstetric management and induced abortion before viability. It is also ethically permissible to offer feticide followed by termination of pregnancy after viability in such cases. This ethically justified approach will reduce the variation in the actual practices of specialists in maternal&ndash;fetal medicine described by Heuser, Eller and Byrne.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Chervenak, F., McCullough, L. B.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-02-13T02:01:25-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2012-100491</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2012-100491</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Responsibly counselling women about the clinical management of pregnancies complicated by severe fetal anomalies]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-02-13</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Commentary</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100207v2?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Forced to be free? Increasing patient autonomy by constraining it]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100207v2?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>It is universally accepted in bioethics that doctors and other medical professionals have an obligation to procure the informed consent of their patients. Informed consent is required because patients have the moral right to autonomy in furthering the pursuit of their most important goals. In the present work, it is argued that evidence from psychology shows that human beings are subject to a number of biases and limitations as reasoners, which can be expected to lower the quality of their decisions and which therefore make it more difficult for them to pursue their most important goals by giving informed consent. It is further argued that patient autonomy is best promoted by constraining the informed consent procedure. By limiting the degree of freedom patients have to choose, the good that informed consent is supposed to protect can be promoted.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Levy, N.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-02-10T02:02:37-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100207</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100207</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Unlocked, Sexual health, Bioethics, Informed consent, Research and publication ethics, Legal and forensic medicine, Human rights]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Forced to be free? Increasing patient autonomy by constraining it]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-02-10</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Feature article</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100103v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Wish-fulfilling medicine in practice: a qualitative study of physician arguments]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100103v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>There has been a move in medicine towards patient-centred care, leading to more demands from patients for particular therapies and treatments, and for wish-fulfilling medicine: the use of medical services according to the patient's wishes to enhance their subjective functioning, appearance or health. In contrast to conventional medicine, this use of medical services is not needed from a medical point of view. Boundaries in wish-fulfilling medicine are partly set by a physician's decision to fulfil or decline a patient's wish in practice. In order to develop a better understanding of how wish-fulfilling medicine occurs in practice in The Netherlands, a qualitative study (15 semistructured interviews and 1 focus group) was undertaken. The aim was to investigate the range and kind of arguments used by general practitioners and plastic surgeons in wish-fulfilling medicine. These groups represent the public funded realm of medicine as well as privately paid for services. Moreover, GPs and plastic surgeons can both be approached directly by patients in The Netherlands. The physicians studied raised many arguments that were expected: they used patient autonomy, risks and benefits, normality and justice to limit wish-fulfilling medicine. In addition, arguments new to this debate were uncovered, which were frequently used to justify compliance with a patient's request. Such arguments seem familiar from conventional medicine, including empathy, the patient&ndash;doctor relationship and reassurance. Moreover, certain arguments that play a significant role in the literature on wish-fulfilling medicine and enhancement were not mentioned, such as concepts of disease and the enhancement&ndash;treatment dichotomy and &lsquo;suspect norms&rsquo;.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Asscher, E. C. A., Bolt, I., Schermer, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-02-08T02:01:20-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100103</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100103</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[General practice / family medicine, Complementary medicine]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Wish-fulfilling medicine in practice: a qualitative study of physician arguments]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-02-08</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Clinical ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100178v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The quality of informed consent: mapping the landscape. A review of empirical data from developing and developed countries]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100178v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<sec><st>Objective</st><p>Some researchers claim that the quality of informed consent of clinical research participants in developing countries is worse than in developed countries. To evaluate this assumption, we reviewed the available data on the quality of consent in both settings.</p></sec><sec><st>Methods</st><p>We conducted a comprehensive PubMed search, examined bibliographies and literature reviews, and consulted with international experts on informed consent in order to identify studies published from 1966 to 2010 that used quantitative methods, surveyed participants or parents of paediatric participants in actual trials, assessed comprehension and/or voluntariness, and did not involve testing particular consent interventions. Forty-seven studies met these criteria. We compared data about participant comprehension and voluntariness. The paucity of data and variation in study methodology limit comparison and preclude statistical aggregation of the data.</p></sec><sec><st>Results and Discussion</st><p>This review shows that the assertion that informed consent is worse in developing countries than in developed countries is a simplification of a complex picture. Despite the limitations of comparison, the data suggest that: (1) comprehension of study information varies among participants in both developed and developing countries, and comprehension of randomisation and placebo controlled designs is poorer than comprehension of other aspects of trials in both settings; and (2) participants in developing countries appear to be less likely than those in developed countries to say they can refuse participation in or withdraw from a trial, and are more likely to worry about the consequences of refusal or withdrawal.</p></sec>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mandava, A., Pace, C., Campbell, B., Emanuel, E., Grady, C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-02-07T06:03:43-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100178</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100178</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Clinical trials (epidemiology), Child health, Bioethics, Informed consent, Legal and forensic medicine]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The quality of informed consent: mapping the landscape. A review of empirical data from developing and developed countries]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-02-07</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Research ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100014v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[HIV-positive status and preservation of privacy: a recent decision from the Italian Data Protection Authority on the procedure of gathering personal patient data in the dental office]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100014v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The processing of sensitive information in the health field is subject to rigorous standards that guarantee the protection of information confidentiality. Recently, the Italian Data Protection Authority (Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali) stated their formal opinion on a standard procedure in dental offices involving the submission of a questionnaire that includes the patient's health status. HIV infection status is included on the form. The Authority has stated that all health data collection must be in accordance with the current Italian normative framework for personal data protection and respect the patient's freedom. This freedom allows the patient to decide, in a conscious and responsible way, whether to share health information with health personnel without experiencing any prejudice in the provision of healthcare requested. Moreover, data collection must be relevant and cannot exceed the principles of treatment goals with reference to the specific care of the concerned person. However, the need for recording information regarding HIV infection at the first appointment, regardless of the clinical intervention or therapeutic plan that needs to be conducted, should not alter the standard protection measures of the healthcare staff. In fact, these measures are adopted for every patient.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Conti, A., Delbon, P., Laffranchi, L., Paganelli, C., De Ferrari, F.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-02-07T06:03:43-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100014</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100014</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Health policy, HIV/AIDS, Sexual health, Confidentiality, Health service research, Legal and forensic medicine, Human rights]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[HIV-positive status and preservation of privacy: a recent decision from the Italian Data Protection Authority on the procedure of gathering personal patient data in the dental office]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-02-07</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Brief report</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100150v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[PPI, paradoxes and Plato: who's sailing the ship?]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100150v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Over the last decade, patient and public involvement (PPI) has become a requisite in applied health research. Some funding bodies demand explicit evidence of PPI, while others have made a commitment to developing PPI in the projects they fund. Despite being commonplace, there remains a dearth of engagement with the ethical and theoretical underpinnings of PPI processes and practices. More specifically, while there is a small (but growing) body of literature examining the effectiveness and impact of PPI, there has been relatively little reflection on whether the concept/practice of PPI is internally coherent. Here, the authors unpick a &lsquo;paradox&rsquo; within PPI, which highlights a tension between its moral and pragmatic motivations and its implementation. The authors argue that this &lsquo;professionalisation paradox&rsquo; means we need to rethink the practice, and purpose, of PPI in research.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ives, J., Damery, S., Redwod, S.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-01-20T07:11:42-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100150</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100150</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Informed consent, Legal and forensic medicine]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[PPI, paradoxes and Plato: who's sailing the ship?]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-01-20</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Research ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100351v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[What makes killing wrong?]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100351v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>What makes an act of killing morally wrong is not that the act causes loss of life or consciousness but rather that the act causes loss of all remaining abilities. This account implies that it is not even pro tanto morally wrong to kill patients who are universally and irreversibly disabled, because they have no abilities to lose. Applied to vital organ transplantation, this account undermines the dead donor rule and shows how current practices are compatible with morality.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Miller, F. G.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-01-19T07:35:39-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100351</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100351</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Disability, Adult intensive care, Mechanical ventilation, Mechanical ventilation, Transplantation, Artificial and donated transplantation, Psychology and medicine]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[What makes killing wrong?]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-01-19</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Feature article</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100340v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Survey of physicians' approach to severe fetal anomalies]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100340v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<sec><st>Objective</st><p>Standards of care regarding obstetric management of life-threatening anomalies are not defined. It is hypothesised that physicians' management of these pregnancies is variable and influenced by demographic factors.</p></sec><sec><st>Design</st><p>A questionnaire was mailed to members of the Society of Maternal&ndash;Fetal Medicine with valid US addresses assessing obstetric management of both &lsquo;uniformly lethal&rsquo; (eg, anencephaly, renal agenesis) and &lsquo;uniformly severe, commonly lethal&rsquo; (eg, trisomy 13 and 18) anomalies. Respondents were asked to answer as if not limited by state/institutional restrictions. Fisher's exact or <sup>2</sup> tests were used as appropriate and correction made for multiple comparisons in analyses that were not prespecified.</p></sec><sec><st>Results</st><p>The response rate was 36% (732/2038). Nearly 100% of respondents discuss termination for both uniformly and commonly lethal anomalies. In continuing pregnancies, with patient request for obstetric non-intervention 99% of providers would comply for either uniformly or commonly lethal anomalies. The majority &lsquo;encourage&rsquo; such management, but some were non-directive or discouraged this management. In continuing pregnancies, with patient request for full obstetric intervention the majority of respondents was willing to comply for both uniformly (71%) and commonly (82%) lethal anomalies. While most practitioners &lsquo;discouraged&rsquo; full intervention, some were non-directive or encouraged this management. Demographics and severity of anomaly influenced counselling.</p></sec><sec><st>Conclusion</st><p>Discrepancies exist regarding the management of life-threatening fetal anomalies. Patients may be offered different options based on practitioner demographics. The majority of physicians comply with patient wishes. Differences were noted when comparing the management of lethal with that of severe commonly lethal anomalies, suggesting that practitioners make a distinction when counselling patients.</p></sec>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Heuser, C. C., Eller, A. G., Byrne, J. L.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-01-19T07:35:39-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100340</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100340</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Epidemiologic studies]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Survey of physicians' approach to severe fetal anomalies]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-01-19</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Reproductive ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100068v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Testing for sexually transmitted infections in a population-based sexual health survey: development of an acceptable ethical approach]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100068v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Population-based research is enhanced by biological measures, but biological sampling raises complex ethical issues. The third British National Survey of Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles (Natsal-3) will estimate the population prevalence of five sexually transmitted infections (STIs) (<I>Chlamydia trachomatis</I>, <I>Neisseria gonorrhoeae</I>, human papillomavirus (HPV), HIV and <I>Mycoplasma genitalium</I>) in a probability sample aged 16&ndash;44&nbsp;years. The present work describes the development of an ethical approach to urine testing for STIs, including the process of reaching consensus on whether to return results. The following issues were considered: (1) testing for some STIs that are treatable and for which appropriate settings to obtain free testing and advice are widely available (Natsal-3 provides all respondents with STI and healthcare access information), (2) limits on test accuracy and timeliness imposed by survey conditions and sample type, (3) testing for some STIs with unknown clinical and public health implications, (4) how a uniform approach is easier to explain and understand, (5) practical difficulties in returning results and cost efficiency, such as enabling wider STI testing by not returning results. The agreed approach, to perform voluntary anonymous testing with specific consent for five STIs without returning results, was approved by stakeholders and a research ethics committee. Overall, this was acceptable to respondents in developmental piloting; 61% (68 of 111) of respondents agreed to provide a sample. The experiences reported here may inform the ethical decision making of researchers, research ethics committees and funders considering population-based biological sampling.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Field, N., Tanton, C., Mercer, C. H., Nicholson, S., Soldan, K., Beddows, S., Ison, C., Johnson, A. M., Sonnenberg, P.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-01-17T11:45:43-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100068</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100068</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Health policy, Epidemiologic studies, HIV/AIDS, Sexual health, Screening (epidemiology), Research and publication ethics, Health service research, Health education, Screening (public health)]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Testing for sexually transmitted infections in a population-based sexual health survey: development of an acceptable ethical approach]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-01-17</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Brief report</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100015v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Croatian medical students see academic dishonesty as an acceptable behaviour: a cross-sectional multicampus study]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100015v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<sec><st>Aim</st><p>To provide insights into the students' attitude towards academic integrity and their perspective of academic honesty at Croatian medical schools.</p></sec><sec><st>Methods</st><p>A cross-sectional study using an anonymous questionnaire containing 29 questions on frequency of cheating, perceived seriousness of cheating, perceptions on integrity atmosphere, cheating behaviour of peers and on willingness to report misconduct. Participants were third-year (preclinical) and fifth-year (clinical) students from all four Croatian Schools of Medicine. Outcome measures were descriptive statistical correlates and differences in students' self-reported educational dishonesty, perceptions of cheating behaviour and medical school integrity atmosphere.</p></sec><sec><st>Results</st><p>Of the 1074 students enrolled in the third and fifth year, 662 (62%) completed the questionnaire. A large proportion of the students (97%) admitted using some method of cheating and 78% admitted engaging in at least one form of misconduct. About 50% had a lenient attitude towards six acts of academic dishonesty. Only 2% reported another student for cheating. Risk factors for cheating were strongly correlated with students' perceptions of peer cheating behaviour, peer approval of cheating, low perception of seriousness of cheating and inappropriate severity level of exams and teaching materials.</p></sec><sec><st>Conclusions</st><p>Cheating is prevalent in Croatian medical schools and academic dishonesty is seen as acceptable behaviour among numerous future Croatian doctors.</p></sec>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kukolja Taradi, S., Taradi, M., Dogas, Z.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-01-12T13:19:12-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100015</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100015</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Patients, Research and publication ethics, Undergraduate]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Croatian medical students see academic dishonesty as an acceptable behaviour: a cross-sectional multicampus study]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-01-12</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Brief report</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100041v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Cognitive neuroenhancement: false assumptions in the ethical debate]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100041v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The present work critically examines two assumptions frequently stated by supporters of cognitive neuroenhancement. The first, explicitly methodological, assumption is the supposition of effective and side effect-free neuroenhancers. However, there is an evidence-based concern that the most promising drugs currently used for cognitive enhancement can be addictive. Furthermore, this work describes why the neuronal correlates of key cognitive concepts, such as learning and memory, are so deeply connected with mechanisms implicated in the development and maintenance of addictive behaviour so that modification of these systems may inevitably run the risk of addiction to the enhancing drugs. Such a potential risk of addiction could only be falsified by in-depth empirical research. The second, implicit, assumption is that research on neuroenhancement does not pose a serious moral problem. However, the potential for addiction, along with arguments related to research ethics and the potential social impact of neuroenhancement, could invalidate this assumption. It is suggested that ethical evaluation needs to consider the empirical data as well as the question of whether and how such empirical knowledge can be obtained.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Heinz, A., Kipke, R., Heimann, H., Wiesing, U.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012-01-06T07:03:52-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100041</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100041</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Research and publication ethics, Psychology and medicine, Health education]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Cognitive neuroenhancement: false assumptions in the ethical debate]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2012-01-06</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Neuroethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100387v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Biodefence and the production of knowledge: rethinking the problem]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100387v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Biodefence, broadly understood as efforts to prevent or mitigate the damage of a bioterrorist attack, raises a number of ethical issues, from the allocation of scarce biomedical research and public health funds, to the use of coercion in quarantine and other containment measures in the event of an outbreak. In response to the US bioterrorist attacks following September 11, significant US policy decisions were made to spur scientific enquiry in the name of biodefence. These decisions led to a number of critical institutional changes within the US federal government agencies governing scientific research. Subsequent science policy discussions have focused largely on &lsquo;the dual use problem&rsquo;: how to preserve the openness of scientific research while preventing research undertaken for the prevention or mitigation of biological threats from third parties. We join others in shifting the ethical debate over biodefence away from a simple framing of the problem as one of dual use, by demonstrating how a dual use framing distorts the debate about bioterrorism and truncates discussion of the moral issues. We offer an alternative framing rooted in social epistemology and institutional design theory, arguing that the ethical and policy debates regarding &lsquo;dual use&rsquo; biomedical research ought to be reframed as a larger optimisation problem across a plurality of values including, among others: (1) the production of scientific knowledge; (2) the protection of human and animal subjects; (3) the promotion and protection of public health (national and global); (4) freedom of scientific enquiry; and (5) the constraint of government power.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Buchanan, A., Kelley, M. C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2011-12-22T01:06:37-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100387</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100387</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Biodefence and the production of knowledge: rethinking the problem]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2011-12-22</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Feature article</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100163v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Ethics, organ donation and tax: a proposal]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100163v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Five arguments are presented in favour of the proposal that people who opt in as organ donors should receive a tax break. These arguments appeal to welfare, autonomy, fairness, distributive justice and self-ownership, respectively. Eight worries about the proposal are considered in this paper. These objections focus upon no-effect and counter-productiveness, the Titmuss concern about social meaning, exploitation of the poor, commodification, inequality and unequal status, the notion that there are better alternatives, unacceptable expense, and concerns about the veto of relatives. The paper argues that none of the objections to the proposal is very telling.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sobirk Petersen, T., Lippert-Rasmussen, K.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2011-12-17T07:45:13-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100163</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100163</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Artificial and donated transplantation, Informed consent, Research and publication ethics, Legal and forensic medicine]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Ethics, organ donation and tax: a proposal]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2011-12-17</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Research ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100213v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Terminal sedation: an emotional decision in end-of-life care]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100213v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>A patient with end-stage motor neurone disease was admitted for hospice care with worsening bulbar symptoms. Although he initially walked onto the ward he became very distressed and asked for sedation. After much discussion, this man was deeply sedated, and after some harrowing days, died. Was it right to provide terminal sedation? What should the threshold be for such treatment? How should our personal reservations affect how we approach the distressed patient in an end-of-life situation?</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Etkind, S. N.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2011-12-02T18:31:18-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100213</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100213</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[End of life decisions (geriatric medicine), Pain (neurology), End of life decisions (palliative care), Hospice, Pain (palliative care), Pain (anaesthesia), Assisted dying, End of life decisions (ethics)]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Terminal sedation: an emotional decision in end-of-life care]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2011-12-02</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Brief report</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100278v2?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Distress from voluntary refusal of food and fluids to hasten death: what is the role of continuous deep sedation?]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/medethics-2011-100278v2?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>In assisted dying, the end-of-life trajectory is shortened to relieve unbearable suffering. Unbearable suffering is defined broadly enough to include cognitive (early dementia), psychosocial or existential distress. It can include old-age afflictions that are neither life-threatening nor fatal in the "vulnerable elderly". The voluntary refusal of food and fluids (VRFF) combined with continuous deep sedation (CDS) for assisted dying is legal. Scientific understanding of awareness of internal and external nociceptive stimuli under CDS is rudimentary. CDS may blunt the wakefulness component of human consciousness without eradicating internal affective awareness of thirst and hunger. Patients may suffer because of the slow dying process following dehydration and starvation. The difficulty to adequately control distress, without bringing the dying process to a rapid conclusion by lethal pharmacological interventions, can cause feelings of guilt among hospice and medical staff. Furthermore, the double-effect principle is not applicable in these situations because the primary objective of VRFF is to hasten death. Legal and societal debate should focus on sharpening the boundaries between assisted dying and palliative care. This separation is necessary to: 1) uphold trust in the patient-phyician relationship, and 2) preserve integrity and ethics of the medical profession.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rady, M. Y., Verheijde, J. L.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2011-11-03T05:56:45-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/medethics-2011-100278</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;medethics-2011-100278</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Distress from voluntary refusal of food and fluids to hasten death: what is the role of continuous deep sedation?]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2011-11-03</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Commentary</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/jme.2010.041632v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The case of biobank with the law: between a legal and scientific fiction]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/jme.2010.041632v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>According to estimates more than 400 biobanks currently operate across Europe. The term &lsquo;biobank&rsquo; indicates a specific field of genetic study that has quietly developed without any significant critical reflection across European societies. Although scientists now routinely use this phrase, the wider public is still confused when the word &lsquo;bank&rsquo; is being connected with the collection of their biological samples. There is a striking lack of knowledge of this field. In the recent Eurobarometer survey it was demonstrated that even in 2010 two-thirds of the respondents had never even heard about biobanks. The term gives the impression that a systematic collection of biological samples can constitute a &lsquo;bank&rsquo; of considerable financial worth, where the biological samples, which are insignificant in isolation but are valuable as a collection, can be preserved, analysed and put to &lsquo;profitable use&rsquo;. By studying the practices of the numerous already existing biobanks, the authors address the following questions: to what extent does the term &lsquo;biobank&rsquo; reflect the normative concept of using biological samples for the purposes of biomedical research? Furthermore, is it in harmony with the so far agreed legal&ndash;ethical consensus in Europe or does it deliberately pull science to the territory of a new, ambiguous commercial field? In other words, do biobanks constitute a medico-legal fiction or are they substantively different from other biomedical research protocols on human tissues?</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sandor, J., Bard, P., Tamburrini, C., Tannsjo, T.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2011-09-24T08:41:02-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/jme.2010.041632</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;jme.2010.041632</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Cardiovascular medicine]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The case of biobank with the law: between a legal and scientific fiction]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2011-09-24</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Law, ethics and medicine</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/jme.2010.038760v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Is the commercialisation of human tissue and body material forbidden in the countries of the European Union?]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/jme.2010.038760v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>The human body and its parts are widely perceived as matters beyond commercial usage. This belief is codified in several national and European documents. This so-called &lsquo;no-property rule&rsquo; is held to be the default position across the countries of the European Union. However, a closer look at the most pertinent national and European documents, and also current practices in the field, reveals a gradual model of commercialisation of human tissue. In particular, we will argue that the ban on commercialisation of body material is not as strict as it may appear at first sight, leaving room for the commercial practice of tissue procurement and transfer. We argue for more transparent information for patients and tissue donors, an intensified ethical debate on commercialisation practices, and a critical review of current normative principles.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lenk, C., Beier, K.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2011-06-22T08:06:14-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/jme.2010.038760</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;jme.2010.038760</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Informed consent, Legal and forensic medicine]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Is the commercialisation of human tissue and body material forbidden in the countries of the European Union?]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2011-06-22</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Law, ethics and medicine</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/jme.2011.042911v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The morality of care: case study and review]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/jme.2011.042911v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This case concerns aspects of the treatment of a post-surgical patient in a major public hospital in New Zealand during the author's experiences as a fourth year medical student. This case is used to consider the interlinked ethical issues of sympathy, moral virtue, dignity and how the medical environment can realign these values.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tatnell, R., Malpas, P. J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2011-05-26T13:35:07-07:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/jme.2011.042911</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;jme.2011.042911</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[Emergency medicine, Pain (neurology), Pain (palliative care), Research and publication ethics, Undergraduate]]></dc:subject>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The morality of care: case study and review]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2011-05-26</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Teaching and learning ethics</prism:section>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/jme.2010.041475v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Freedom of movement across the EU: legal and ethical issues for children with chronic disease]]></title>
<link>http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/jme.2010.041475v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>While freedom of movement has been one of the most highly respected human right across the EU, there are various aspects which come into play which still need to be resolved for this to be achieved in practice. One of these key issues is cross border health care. Indeed, there is an increasing awareness of standardisation of health service provision and cross border collaboration in the EU. However, certain groups particularly children may be at risk of suboptimal treatment as a result. We present the case of a child patient which highlights the complexity of this matter spanning family law, health law, social security law as well as ethical issues. EU legislation needs to ensure that children patients have access to high quality care across the EU borders.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mercieca, C., Aquilina, K., Pullicino, R., Borg, A. A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2011-01-24T06:46:32-08:00</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1136/jme.2010.041475</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>hwp:master-id:medethics;jme.2010.041475</dc:identifier>
<dc:publisher>Institute of Medical Ethics</dc:publisher>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Freedom of movement across the EU: legal and ethical issues for children with chronic disease]]></dc:title>
<prism:publicationDate>2011-01-24</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Brief report</prism:section>
</item>
</rdf:RDF>
