Freedom

On the face of it, there seem to be four things we are trying to get at, either individually or together, when we raise an objection like censorship ‘violates scientific freedom/openness’. Recall that I take scientific freedom to be the freedom to publish scientific information without interference. What I am interested in is the moral weight this carries, or should carry, in debates about dual-use research.

First, we might think that scientific freedom is good for its own sake; given two otherwise identical worlds, the world with scientific openness (or more scientific openness) is simply better than the world without (or with less) scientific openness. But this does not seem a factor that can, on its own, justify publication of the H5N1 studies. Even if scientific freedom is valuable for its own sake, it is surely not more valuable than preventing mass casualties in the event of the release, accidental or deliberate, of modified H5N1.

More plausibly, we might think that science requires freedom and openness to function properly for three reasons: (1) to confirm and replicate results; (2) build on existing scientific knowledge to create new knowledge and progress in science; (3) to claim priority over a discovery.24 I will show that these reasons are not enough to defend H5N1 against censorship.

It is not clear that confirming results necessitates complete openness. The NSABB originally proposed that vetted scientists be allowed access to the full H5N1 studies to confirm and replicate the results.10 ,14 This could, if designed properly, allow control over who has access to the results, promoting biosafety and biosecurity without sacrificing the validity of the results.

Moreover, there is a good reason to restrict access because of the possibility of the study being replicated. For every successful replication of the result, there is a chance the created strain of H5N1 will escape containment; the more times the experiment is repeated, the more chance of a catastrophic outcome.25 It is prudent, qualified by the need to do good science, to limit not just who reproduces the studies, but how often these studies are reproduced.

The second claim is that scientific freedom and openness are essential to the structure of science. Put another way: in order to create valuable knowledge, we need to ensure science is open and free. Particularly, if we believe we have little prior knowledge of where innovative and beneficial research will arise, maximising openness maximises the chance of reaping the benefits of new research.26

However, it seems that rejecting regulation based on the uncertainty of how science will progress possesses limited force as a justification. On the broadest level, significant effort is put into funding allocation to decide which projects and scientists will produce the best results. These systems are subject to their own critique; nevertheless, they show that we can and do have certain expectations about where good research will occur and what research should be done. If such judgements are plausible in deciding what science should be done, why not in whom we allow to access the H5N1 studies? There is a clear trade-off between security and progress here, but it is one that we can vary as circumstances fit.

By way of example, the Manhattan project saw scientific and technological advancements of considerable sophistication (ie, the building of an atomic bomb) that required novel knowledge creation in areas of quantum mechanics, shock physics, metallurgy, early computational science, and materials science. This work was pursued in a highly classified community, yet allowed for results to be reliable and progress to be made with limited openness.27 Extra openness may add an extra layer of security in establishing knowledge about the world; but it is not at all clear that this epistemic security is so important that it would always, on reflection, outweigh other concerns of physical security.

The claim that openness is valuable because it leads to scientific progress seems prima facie true—we might think that progressing scientific knowledge is valuable for its own sake, independent of the use of that knowledge. We also value the material benefits we gain from that knowledge in terms of health and other important goods. That requires further inquiry, which I will turn to in the next section.

Yet scientific progress, whether for the sake of new knowledge or other gains, is not the only thing we care about. Researchers already accept certain restrictions on what information they may disseminate. For example, we generally believe that it is impermissible, on moral grounds, to release the personal information and identities of human research subjects. I suspect we would think this is so even if doing so would lead to more scientific knowledge and progress. It is permissible for a journal to prevent the publications of information and identifies of research participants because openness of this kind would violate the privacy of individuals. The value of respecting the privacy of experimental subjects, in this case, outweighs the value promoted through publication. It doesn't seem that we would abandon this or any other fundamental element of medical bioethics solely on the consideration of progress. It isn't clear, then, why progress should outweigh other considerations in this dual-use dilemma without knowing a little more about what type of progress we are talking about, and examine the consequences of pursuing that progress.

Finally, openness clearly benefits researchers by allowing them to claim priority over scientific discoveries, leading to material and status gains in the process. But one would be hard pressed to justify that the status gained by scientists would be so valuable as to outweigh the potential malevolent uses of the modified H5N1 virus.ⁱⁱ Moreover, if we take considerations of status seriously, a large amount of status could be lost if the publications were released, and a mass casualty event like a bioterror attack then occurred. The reputations of nuclear scientists, for example, have suffered from a litany of malevolent uses, reckless practices, unforseen accidents and lack of public education that hamper the development of the field outside of classified laboratories. It is likely the biological sciences would likewise suffer a great blow to their standing if bioweapons attacks occurred.

Benefits and costs

In the last section, I argued that if one wanted to justify publishing the H5N1 studies, one would have to demonstrate that the value of scientific freedom outweighed the potential harm that could occur through malevolent use of the research. So far, I have argued that justifications based on the value of scientific freedom do not meet that challenge. One could argue, however, that the benefits of the H5N1 studies in terms of their contribution to medicine and public health really do outweigh the potential dangers. I will now argue against that possibility, based on the three main claims made about the benefits of these studies: that it (1) alerts the community about the dangers of H5N1, (2) enables disease surveillance and (3) enables vaccine production.

To the first claim, we should ask first to whom we refer when we talk of alerting ‘the community’. If by ‘the community’ we mean the public, then the current controversy alone has achieved this goal. The announcement of the results, and the recommendation to censor the methodology were sufficient to raise awareness of the danger. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the methodological details of the H5N1 studies—the details of most concern—are useful to the public for the purpose of raising awareness.

This argument is even less convincing if by ‘the community’ we mean scientists or security experts. Scientists are clearly concerned about the risk of pandemic flu—Fouchier's presentation in Malta was during a session on pandemic potentials. Security experts and governments are likewise taking action, evidenced by the estimated US$6.42 billion allocated by the US to biodefence for the 2012 financial year, up from US$5billion in 2010 and despite US economic turmoil.28

When it comes to disease surveillance, there is the question of whether the information contained in the studies could be useful. It has been argued that there is no guarantee that an emerging human transmissible strain of H5N1 will be the same as the strains created in the H5N1 studies.4 ,15 This would then undercut the value of the studies vis-à-vis surveillance. Keim has argued further that because of this possibility, these studies could in fact be counterproductive to surveillance.4

Vaccines run into similar problems. Similar to the argument against the value of the research for surveillance, it is not clear that the strains described in this research will match evolutionary pathways that occur in nature.4 ,15 As with surveillance, it may be counterproductive to focus our vaccination efforts on lab-created strains.

However, even if technically plausible, surveillance and vaccine distribution rely on political, social, ethical and technical factors that may not presently exist. The claims made about the benefit of science are ethical claims—that is, they are claims about what is morally valuable in life, such as health—but, moreover, are ethical claims about the consequences of research. However, in order to bring these consequences about—in order to gain the benefits of improved disease surveillance or vaccine production and distribution—one has to have institutions that actually further this goal. If not, the chance that this beneficial state of affairs will occur is minimal.

As it stands, the political will to institute widespread public health measures within nations, much less globally, is small.29 That is, even in developed nations there are continuing and protracted political debates about the allocation of funding, structure and use of public health institutions.30 The likelihood that the H5N1 studies will actually bring about a good state of affairs, then, is proportionately decreased compared against if public health received strong and widespread support. Claims to the utility of surveillance tools or vaccines that emerge from this research are just as contingent as, say, the chances that someone will use the research to commit an act of bioterrorism.

Moreover, there are serious differences in public health responsiveness between nations. We therefore run the risk—assuming that these benefits obtained— of protecting ourselves at the cost of more vulnerable populations. Consider the event of an attack using the modified H5N1 virus. There is little chance it will remain contained in a particular geographic area. Developed population centres will likely suffer from an outbreak; developing nations could be devastated. Even if we believed it was likely these advances could benefit certain communities on a local scale, the harms posed are global and severe.

As beneficial as we might find the research, it is unlikely that the H5N1 studies will provide any near-term benefit for the population at large. The institutions and infrastructure on which those benefits depend are not likely to materialise without significant effort. Moreover, even if we succeed in developing this infrastructure on a local level (eg within the USA), those populations that experience the worst of bird flu—typically developing nations with poor public health measures—are left vulnerable.