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Defining and Delineating a Duty to Prognosticate

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Abstract

Prognostication, the process offormulating and communicating a prognosis, isno longer considered by most physicians to bean essential task in caring for patients withserious illness. Because of this fact, it isnot surprising to find that when physiciansattempt to engage in prognostication, they doit poorly. What may be surprising to thoseoutside the medical community is the extent towhich professional norms have developed whichactively discourage physicians from engaging inprognostication. This article explores thecauses of this state of affairs and thejustifications offered for it. The conclusionis reached that physicians have a professionalresponsibility to competently engage inprognostication based upon the doctrine ofinformed consent, and that a failure or refusalto do so has not only potential legalramifications, but serious negativeimplications for many of the core issues inbioethics, such as the use of advancedirectives, palliative medicine, and medicalfutility.

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  1. University of California-Davis Medical Center, 4150 V Street, Suite 2400, Sacramento, California, 95817, USA

    Ben A. Rich

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Rich, B.A. Defining and Delineating a Duty to Prognosticate. Theor Med Bioeth 22, 177–192 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011466711211

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