Displaying 1-10 letters out of 429 published
A very difficult area
A very difficult area indeed. My view is that that, once you have decided to stop fluids and/or nutrition, then the patient will certainly die. Whether or not they will suffer whilst starving, or dehydrating, is unclear. However, prolonging life in such cases extends suffering for relatives, staff, and possibly/probably the patient.
A lethal injection at this point is surely more humane than extending life and, thus, extending suffering. As a profession doctors should surely see a 'good' death as a part of the care we should be providing. I can see nothing good about allowing someone to starve to death, because we feel that taking an active step, is a step too far. We have already decided that they are going to die. Why not provide the quickest and most painless death possible?
Conflict of Interest:
A relative is in this situation
The best argument against the organ market still awaits refutation
Critics of a regulated market in organs have correctly focussed on its inability to protect the vendor from coercion and exploitation. However, they have consistently failed to realise that coercion and exploitation are not immanent in this market. Rather, they are immanent in the need to even consider selling ones organs (free people do not engage in such considerations). In other words, the critics have failed to acknowledge that a regulated market in organs should, at least theoretically, be able to protect the vendor from coercion and exploitation that might occur within the sphere of exchange, but it cannot protect the vendor, not even theoretically, from coercion and exploitation that occur universally outside this sphere. Even worse, its ethical guise would only serve to conceal and reinforce them.
In this light, criticism of any organ market could make sense only if it were part of the greater struggle against the oppressive social conditions that have made it a viable option to begin with. This anti- market argument still awaits refutation.
Conflict of Interest:
Authorship for the grant winners and postgraduates
The article was well read and understood. I would like to draw the attention of readers to the current reality, of having grant winners who are not the authors even though their hypothesis and proposal writing has contributed significantly and scientifically towards achieving the grant/funds, followed by processing of the entire scientific/social projects based on the proposed hypothesis. Authorship is considered to be reserved only for persons who have been receiving primary credit and have been holding a primary responsibility for published work (experimental data or data from other means like literature review, meta-analysis etc) (APA Publication manual, 2001). International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE, 1997) has formulated regulations for scientific writing and ethical regulations in publishing/ maintaining the quality of scientific writing globally. These regulations are currently acceptable all over the world, in its original form or these regulations have been modified by respective countries, institutes, departments, units and research groups as per need of the time, space, funding and legislations.
According to the ICMJE, the authorship credit should be defined/ based on meeting all four of the following conditions:
1) Substantial contribution to the study includes: i. Conception and design, (e.g. Co-investigator, consultant or research support staff who have intellectually contributed to the grant proposal) OR ii. Clinical or methodological support throughout the implementation of the study (generally through participation in regular team meetings) OR iii. Analysis and interpretation of data
2) Provide important intellectual contribution towards the conceptualization or writing and reviewing multiple drafts of the article or abstract in a timely fashion.
3) Final approval of the version to be published (or may waive final approval at a point where no more substantial changes are to be made).
4) Are prepared to take public responsibility for the paper.
Keeping in view the above mentioned conditions, There are a variety of formal strategies of weighting the contributions of co-authors (Digiusto, 1993). For instance, issues where students are considered as co author or/ and student as grant holders still need a lot of discussion and regulation as per consensus of the entire group to be agreed upon. Many countries (for example, Malaysia) now allows a Phd or MSc student to be a Principle investigator to hold the grant, where supervisors and the seniors still have the final say as to whether student can be the first author/ coauthor even though he/she is holding a grant as a grant winner. Another important issue in this aspect is the biased authorship privilege, which is abducted from the articles written by the students as main authors. This is done for the sake of either maintaining the keep performance index (KPI) of the university or for personal professional benefits to improve the CV of supervisor or any of the members of the research group. Still it could be legal though it is not ethical. The issues regarding the ghost authors taking privilege from the grant winners is another area to be discussed. I will suggest that there is a need to compile a meta analysis of all such studies to be discussed strategically and conclusively with reference to ICMJE and as per my opinion that a single article can't bring in any necessary change without consulting the ICMJE.
American Psychological Association. (2001). Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (5th ed.). Washington, DC: Author.
Diguiusto, E. (1993). Equity in authorship: A strategy for assigning credit when publishing. Social Science and Medicine, 38(1), 55-58.
Conflict of Interest:
Re:Suicide tourism may not change the courts but the courts could alter suicide tourism
The term 'suicide tourism' was first coined by the media for obvious reasons. Is it necessary to use such a repugnant term though. When used to refer to a group collectively this insult can can be glossed over- in a way it could not without causing anger if referring to an individual who takes the harrowing decision to go abroad for an assisted death. To refer to the increased number of people 'from England' (presumably Wales is still included )as being 'outsourced'(ref responses) like a commodity, is dehumanising. However strong opinions may be the right of people to be treated with respect and dignity is paramount, not their usefulness to support an argument.
Conflict of Interest:
I support the right of individuals to decide when to die but have no competing interests
Re "Advance consent, critical interests and dementia research"
Formulating the desire to consent in advance to research as a critical interest is a valuable addition to the literature on consent to research by incapacitated individuals. As Dr. Buller notes, much attention has been paid to these concerns in the literature and many states have enacted statutes protecting human research subjects. States vary in how thoroughly they treat the topic, with some carefully defining who may provide proxy consent to research under what circumstances, while others provide virtually no guidance on proxy consent. What is interesting to note given Dr. Buller's article, though, is that proxy- focused approaches using human subjects research laws fall short of providing health care recipients the ability to affirmatively assert their right to consent to research--to express their critical interest in research participation in a legally binding format.
Dr. Buller notes that advance research directives have not gained wide support, yet documenting one's consent to research in advance is arguably the most patient/participant-centered and empowering way to document one's critical interest in participating in research. A relatively recent change in Virginia's Health Care Decisions Act warrants attention on this point. Virginia appears to be the only state that has codified the possibility of advance consent to research and has included consent to research explicitly among the powers of a designated health care agent. Some states, such as California, note in human subjects research laws that an agent may consent to research if such power has been granted in an advance directive, but the separate statutory language concerning advance directives does not make any mention of including preferences and instructions regarding research in advance directives.
In contrast, Virginia explicitly authorizes consent to research in an advance directive (Va. Code s 54.1-2983.1. http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi- bin/legp504.exe?000+cod+54.1-2983.1) and also includes the power to consent to research among the agent's powers on the model form (Va. Code s 54.1-2984. http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?000+cod+54.1-2984; see also the "Integrated AD Form" http://www.virginiaadvancedirectives.org/option-1--integrated-ad.html). Moreover, recognizing that people may feel differently about research depending on whether it may offer a direct benefit to them or not, the power to consent is described in two separate provisions so that people may opt to choose both, one, or neither. As with any other "default powers" in a Virginia form, the two powers may certainly be struck through, and users of the form are made aware of this at the beginning of the list of powers.
Virginia has well-developed human subjects research laws, as well, which can control when no advance directive is available. Nonetheless, the right to consent to research as a critical interest can be best exercised through affirmative documentation in an advance directive, rather than through a proxy's inferences about a patient's desire to take part in research after he or she has lost capacity. Virginia has recognized the importance of providing mechanisms for people to consent in advance to research and incorporates research provisions directly into its Health Care Decisions Act.
Conflict of Interest:
Suicide tourism may not change the courts but the courts could alter suicide tourism
I have no argument with Charles Foster's tortuously argued claim that suicide tourism has not led to a change in prosecutorial policy, although I am far more exercised by the potential for change in the latter influencing requirement for the former. Nor do I disagree with his admission that it is intellectually dishonest for us to allow Swiss clinics to siphon off our sufferings and responsibility, except to add that it's also immoral of us to do so.
Where I take issue with him is with his blithe statement that allowing the status quo to continue "is likely to do less harm overall than introducing any conceivable assisted suicide law into England."
The conceivable law now in question is Lord Falconer's Assisted Dying Bill and this provides for safeguards and transparency that have been long and carefully considered, are modelled on laws in Oregon operating successfully for seventeen years, are certainly more comprehensive than those pertaining in Switzerland; and are our own. As such, they aim to address the unnecessary, inevitable suffering resulting from the necessity to travel - and be able to travel - to die in alien surroundings. Yes, Dr. Foster, this is a moral as well as an intellectual challenge.
Dr Richard clubb
Conflict of Interest:
Does the pragmatic model undermine the importance of the ethical obligations involved in information process? A defence of continuous genetic counselling for research participants.
Hallowell et al. advocate an interesting pragmatic approach to the disclosure of genetic information in research settings. Furthermore, they present a useful framework which explicitly addresses advantages and disadvantages linked to different feedback policies researchers could pursue (Hallowell et al. 2014, table 1).
We agree with the authors that the feedback of findings from whole- genome sequencing (WGS) or whole-exome sequencing (WES) technologies cannot be considered as automated processes of data disclosure. Since we have to take into account the research participant's autonomy as well as the prevention of possible harms related to the disclosure of genetic information, feedback policies have to be carefully chosen and thought over.
In its evaluation of feedback policies, the authors state that no feedback undermines participant autonomy (policy A) and choosing their feedback option maximizes it (policy E) (Hallowell et al. 2014, table 1). However, more freedom to choose feedback options is not necessarily related to a more autonomous choice of the participant. It could be argued against Hallowell et al. that if in the information platforms suggested by Kaye et al. (2012) research participants were responsible to select on their own what level of research participation they consent to and which results they would access, this would not necessarily represent a more autonomous decision. This one-dimensional view of autonomy undermines the importance of intelligible communicative information transmission (Manson and O'Neill 2007) an essential and ethically demanded dimension of research participants' autonomous decision making (Eyal 2012).
As an alternative to Hallowell et al. interpretation of autonomy, Manson and O'Neill (2007) suggest an agency-based approach that is based on informational and communicative obligations between the parties of counsellors and patients in a clinical context that could be extended to the process of information disclosure in genetic research. Assuming that the researcher's interest does not primarily focus on the information submission to the participants but on the generation of scientific knowledge, the agency-based approach between counsellor and participant could provide a better framework for assuring intelligible communicative information for the research participant. Autonomy should not refer only to more options to choose from, but also to an enhanced comprehension of information on possible harms and benefits of WGS/WES technologies.
Hallowell et al. state that feedback of genetic findings goes hand in hand with extensive resources consumed due to the information costs arising in the communication process. Nonetheless, it can be objected that information costs should not exceed the normal information costs of a clinical setting. E.g. after receiving the research results and counselling the participant, the counsellor may initiate a personalized genetic test in order to correctly approve the general finding in the participant's personal context. Thus, the counsellor who stays in close contact with the participant is responsible for the information disclosure and information revealing is part of the counsellor-participant relationship. The counsellor therefore can be considered as the link between research (research results are usually published in journals or data bases) and the participant.
Furthermore, it would be incorrect to consider researchers and sponsors as the only responsible agents for the costs of informational and communicative obligations. As it occurs with other ethical requirements in research settings such as post-trial obligations of access to beneficial information and interventions (WMA 2013 paragraphs 26 and 34, Mastroleo 2014), other agents -e.g. host country governments- have interests in and bear responsibility for the participants' health needs. So, following commonly held principles for conducting human health research, it could be argued that in advance of a clinical trial, sponsors, researchers and governments (among other agents) should make provisions and bear the economic costs of continuous genetic counselling for participants who may need it.
Finally, besides discussing obligations of researchers towards participants and pointing out the numerous problems arising in this case (information costs, data quality, communication restrictions etc.), we should also focus on the communication process between counsellor and research participant as well as the counsellor's obligations towards potential participants prior to the participation in research projects. If we are taking seriously ethical obligation of genetic information process towards research participants, the consequences of data revealing should be discussed before samples are collected. Moreover, data disclosure should be a continuous process underlying the "nature" of genetic information: research on genetic data is an ongoing process; ideally it should be moderated by a counsellor to grant research participants truly informed and autonomous decisions.
Eyal, N. (2012). "Informed Consent", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/informed-consent/#VolCon
Hallowell, N., Hall, A., Alberg, C., Zimmern, R. (2014). "Revealing the results of whole-genome sequencing and whole-exome sequencing in research and clinical investigations: some ethical issues". JME; 0:1-5.
WMA Declaration of Helsinki (2013). "Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects.", http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/
Kaye, J., Curren, L., Anderson, N. (2012). From patients to partners: participant-centric initiatives in biomedical research. Nat Rev Genet; 3: 371-6.
Manson, N., O'Neill, O. (2007). Rethinking informed consent in bioethics. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Mastroleo, I. (2014). "Consideraciones sobre las obligaciones posinvestigaci?n en la Declaraci?n de Helsinki 2013." Revista de bio?tica y derecho; 31: 51-65, http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/RBD/article/view/10438
We would like to thank Prof. Mertelsmann for helpful comments on this letter.
Both authors were involved in the drafting and writing of this piece. Both authors approved the final version of the manuscript and are accountable for all aspects included in it.
Conflict of Interest:
Re:' Good Death'?
Every person's death will be unique and their response to treatment not altogether predictable. The recent degrading way a man on 'death row' in USA was put to death, using drugs which prolonged his dying by around two hours was obviously grotesque . Doctors gave the injections. The limits of responsibility by prescribing doctors in UK if assisted dying becomes law, must be made clear to both persons receiving 'help' and prescribers so that s/he does not necessarily become liable of possible legal consequences should things 'go wrong'- the emotional pain of involvement in a bungled death would be difficult to handle to say the least.
Conflict of Interest:
Honestly, this is one of the silliest articles I have ever read in the Journal of Medical Ethics. Apart from a host of other objections, I wonder if the author has investigated whether IVF actually raises the birth-rate, an essential consideration if she is to prove that the pitter- patter of little carbon footprints is environmentally unsustainable.
I suspect that the net effect of IVF is to depress the birth-rate. One of the few studies of this issue was done in 2007 by Rand Europe http://goo.gl/U4VkVj. It pointed out that the availability of IVF leads women to delay child-bearing. For some of them it will be too late for them to have a child, even with IVF. If this is true, says the report, "then it may actually have a negative effect on the [total fertility rate] and consequently lead to further ageing of the population".
Good theology, like good bioethics, is based on facts.
Conflict of Interest:
Asking the Right Autonomy Question about Genomic Tests
Eline Bunnik's comment(1) concludes with the observation that not all existing direct-to-consumer genetic tests enhance the autonomy of their consumers, not if autonomy is understood in the Razian sense employed in my article.(2) This is a demanding sense of autonomy, one that requires the presence of an adequate range of valuable options from which to choose. Bunnik's conclusion is difficult to disagree with, but that's because it is sheer commonsense. No existing services of any kind are guaranteed to enhance their consumers' autonomy. It all depends on various factors such as the nature and quality of the service, the conditions under which it is delivered, and the use made of it by consumers. What is surprising is that Bunnik reads me as disagreeing with this banal truth.
Contrary to Bunnik's interpretation, in the article I explicitly stated that '[my] defence of DTC genomics in principle is not to be confused with the defence of existing DTC genomic services, which may be deficient in various ways. The point is that these deficiencies are not inherent and ineradicable' (p.4). So, contra Bunnik, I was not engaged in the na?ve, cheerleading enterprise of defending all existing forms of DTC genomic services, many of which are problematic in ways identified in the article. Instead, I argued that such services can, in principle, enhance autonomy if they meet certain conditions, and that this fact is sufficient to yield a pro tanto case for the legal permissibility of services that do in fact satisfy those conditions.
Putting aside this radical misunderstanding, I turn now to the three 'crucial considerations' Bunnik claims that I overlook in supposedly rejecting her truistic conclusion.
The first consideration is that 'genomic testing' is very heterogeneous, and that this limits our ability to make general moral assessments of such tests, including judgments about their utility. Again, it is odd that Bunnik reads me as disagreeing with this further truism. On the contrary, I emphasized that the medical actionability of DTC genomics depends on variables such as which kind of test is employed and which sort of condition is being investigated. Indeed, precisely because DTC genomic services exhibit considerable variety, I argued, it is wrong to endorse a sweeping skepticism about their utility, clinical or non-clinical.
From the fact that DTC genomic services exhibit this variation, does it follow that it is impossible to identify general principles bearing on their legal permissibility? This is what Bunnik suggests, but provides no argument. Many of the phenomena regulated by law exhibit a similar variability, but it does not mean that we have to resort to a case-by-case assessment of their permissibility, one that does not draw on more general considerations. Indeed, Bunnik herself, in offering an alternative approach to autonomy-based arguments for DTC genomic services in her final paragraph, seems committed to the possibility of the sort of general moral assessments regarding which she expresses skepticism. If the heterogeneity of DTC genomic services stands in the way of a general assessment based on Razian autonomy, why is such an assessment suddenly possible when we substitute Bunnik's favoured concepts of agency, control and freedom? Inexplicably, she seems to want to have it both ways: denying the possibility of a general moral assessment while simultaneously offering one.
Second, Bunnik claims that I 'confound' two distinct senses of autonomy, asking whether I argue 'that DTC genomic testing generates valuable options or that it is a valuable option'. Although there is a genuine distinction here, Bunnik does not explain why she thinks I overlook it and, if so, what trouble this causes for my argument. For the record, I believe that under certain conditions, DTC genomic testing can enhance autonomy in both ways: acquisition of the information it provides can itself be a valuable option, e.g. acquiring ones' raw data, knowledge of one's genealogy or the likely course of one's future health, and possession of this information can generate additional valuable options, e.g. to pursue family connections, or even to seek medical care, etc.(3,4)
Third, I come to perhaps Bunnik's key criticism, i.e. 'most of these tests do not generate (actionable) options at all, medical or non- medical'. Everything here depends on the slippery qualification 'most'. The success of my argument does not depend on showing that all or most existing DTC genomic services generate valuable options. It only requires a plausible case for believing that DTC genomic services are capable of generating such valuable options under feasibly attainable circumstances. In the article, I enumerated a number of valuable options such services are able to generate beyond clinical utility: enhanced knowledge of one's genetic constitution, participation in medical research, information about ancestry, and so on. Bunnik asserts that these options lack the value necessary for Razian autonomy, but in the absence of an adequate supporting argument, this remains an assertion. At one point, Bunnik appears to dismiss such utilities by saying there is a difference between perceived utility and actual utility. However, this distinction does not license the somber conclusion that the enjoyment people derive from DTC genomic services, e.g. by participating in research, fails to enhance their well-being. (5,6) Enjoyment, knowledge and accomplishment, which can be achieved through such participation, are familiar elements of human well-being.(7)
Finally, it is worth noting Bunnik's claim that autonomy-based arguments for a liberal regulatory approach to DTC genomic services should appeal to a narrow sense of autonomy, rather than the 'thick' Razian employed in my article. This narrow sense would, among other things, dispense with the requirement of an adequate range of valuable options. Bunnik's contention, summarily delivered in the final paragraph, is that autonomy-based arguments should instead rely on the less demanding 'values' of agency, control, and freedom to decide. Bunnik is certainly right that this would be an easier way of defending DTC genomic services. But the real question is whether it is so easy that it provides no real defence. Such a defence will be made out only if bare agency, control and freedom to decide are truly 'values' and, moreover, values with a claim to be respected and promoted through law and public policy. Yet this is precisely what leading philosophical critics of the narrow sense of autonomy, such as O'Neill and Raz, have called into questioned. In the absence of a response to such critics, Bunnik's alternative approach to autonomy remains under-motivated.
In short, for the greater part of her response, Bunnik wrestles with an opponent of her own imagining. To the extent that she genuinely engages with claims that I make, her contentions - about clinical/non-clinical utility and the proper understanding of autonomy - ultimately beg the question.
1. Bunnik E. Do genomic tests enhance autonomy? J Med Ethics. 2014 Jun 30. pii: medethics-2014-102171.
2. Vayena E. Direct-to-consumer genomics on the scales of autonomy. J Med Ethics. 2014 May 5. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2014-102026.
3. Roberts ME, Riegert-Johnson DL, Thomas BC. Self diagnosis of Lynch syndrome using direct to consumer genetic testing: a case study. J Genet Couns. 2011 Aug;20(4):327-9. doi: 10.1007/s10897-011-9356-y.
4. Francke U, Dijamco C, Kiefer AK, Eriksson N, Moiseff B et al. Dealing with the unexpected: consumer responses to direct-access BRCA mutation testing. PeerJ 2013 1:e8 http://dx.doi.org/10.7717/peerj.8
5. Vayena E, Ineichen C, Stoupka E, Hafen E. Playing a part in research? University students' attitudes to direct-to-consumer genomics. Public Health Genomics. 2014;17(3):158-68. doi: 10.1159/000360257.
6. Vayena E, Gourna E, Streuli J, Hafen E, Prainsack B. Experiences of early users of direct-to-consumer genomics in Switzerland: an exploratory study. Public Health Genomics. 2012;15(6):352-62. doi: 10.1159/000343792.
7. Griffin J. Value Judgment: Improving our Ethical Beliefs (Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.29-30
Conflict of Interest: