RT Journal Article
SR Electronic
T1 Moral duties and euthanasia: why to kill is not necessarily the same as to let die
JF Journal of Medical Ethics
JO J Med Ethics
FD BMJ Publishing Group Ltd and Institute of Medical Ethics
SP 766
OP 767
DO 10.1136/jme.2011.044966
VO 37
IS 12
A1 Hugh McLachlan
YR 2011
UL http://jme.bmj.com/content/37/12/766.abstract
AB David Shaw's response to Hugh McLachlan's criticism of his proposed new perspective on euthanasia is ineffectual, mistaken and unfair. It is false to say that the latter does not present an argument to support his claim that there is a moral difference between killing and letting die. It is not the consequences alone of actions that constitute their moral worth. It can matter too what duties are breached or fulfilled by the particular moral agents who are involved.