The Roman Catholic Church and embryonic stem cells

Skene and Parker raise a number of concerns about religious doctrine unduly influencing law and public policy through amicus curiae contributions to civil litigations or direct lobbying of politicians. Oakley1 picks this up in an essay with an emphasis on the Roman Catholic Church’s interest in preventing the destruction of embryos for embryonic stem cell research. Skene, Parker, and Oakley seem to be concerned mostly with religious views having undue influence on public policy. My concern is the negative effect that such Church influenced public policy may have on the progress of the biomedical research that is itself foundational to the debate. Oakley seems to be particularly incensed that, as he puts it: “Those who support a total ban on embryonic stem cell research sometimes talk as if theirs are the only views based on moral principle”. What seems to be at issue here though are not the moral principles of the sanctity and dignity of human life, but the application of those moral principles to biomedical research.

The Roman Catholic Church has historically defended the sanctity and dignity of human life to varying degrees at different times. Human life for much of the past 2000 years was defined by the Church as the presence of the soul, which was thought at different times to appear at various different stages during development. Only recently, with the advent of modern biology, has the Roman Catholic Church shifted its position to claim that the fertilised egg also qualifies as the right sort of human life. It should be noted that this doctrinal change was fundamentally driven by developments in our understanding of embryology and not the process of ensoulment.

The Church’s current position on the embryo is thus based not solely on Church doctrine but also on a specific interpretation of our empirical observations of human development. It is the Church’s interpretation of the biology of early human development that is foundational to their current stand against experimentation on early embryos. However one of the reasons we may wish to experiment on early embryos is that we know surprisingly little about them. In fact any position that claims to be based on a solid, empirical understanding of the embryo is essentially misleading, as we simply do not have the data available. The reply to this will inevitably be that we know enough about embryos to make certain claims. For example the Roman Catholic Church likes to point out that the early embryo is obviously the earliest stage of a human life, and thus attributes to it many characteristics associated with adult people. Many would disagree with this on the grounds that the Church has confused being merely human with being a person. I am concerned by the claim that the early embryo is obviously the early stages of a human life.

My concern is not that the claim isn’t obvious to some people but that obviousness is a dangerous thing when it comes to science. It is, for example, quite obvious to me that I am currently sitting at my desk. Empirically my senses seem to confirm that I am more or less stationary. I may well believe that I am stationary for most of human history we believed the earth to be stationary at the centre of the universe. This assumption was confirmed in the Western world by the Church itself. Church doctrine confirmed that the earth was the centre of the universe with the heavens above and hell below. When Galileo challenged this view by promoting the sun centred Copernican system of cosmology the Roman Catholic Church attempted to silence him. The Church’s attack on Galileo and Copernicism was tripartite. Firstly, the Copernican system appeared to contradict some scriptures. Secondly, the Copernican system contradicted the Church-sanctioned science of the day represented by Aristotelian physics. Thirdly, was the appeal to obviousness or the immediate evidence of the senses.

Of the three, only the scriptural objections were fundamentally doctrinal in nature. The appeals to science and obviousness were able to be settled by empirical evidence. We now know that we are not stationary at the centre of the universe although this is still far from obvious to many people.

Any position that claims to be based on a solid, empirical understanding of the embryo is misleading: we simply do not have the data.

The situation 400 years ago regarding Copernicanism thus seems to be very similar to that today regarding the status of the early embryo. The Roman Catholic Church tried to prevent Galileo from publishing empirical evidence using his telescope and disseminating his empirical evidence by banning his books. Similarly the Church today has attempted to prevent the gathering of empirical data on the early embryo by promoting a ban on all experimentation on early embryos.

The Copernican revolution itself has become a paradigm for the process of theory change in science. Science is not simply a collection of facts but an essentially productive process and progress of science. For all its claims of objectivity science is, so the philosophers of science tell us, essentially a theoretical construct. The practical and theoretical sides of science are of course intimately connected. In fact it is well known that a researcher’s actions and observations are most likely guided to some degree by their own hopes and expectations. These same researchers develop the theories that they use to interpret their data. These theories fit the results (or facts) that have been previously observed and predict new experiments to be done. The role of theory at this stage of the process is often underestimated. Theories do not fall out of results. In fact in biology especially theories are often essential to making sense of what is observed (result) and what is noise (artefact). Theory then is not just a bridge to the next fact or experiment but arguably the very heart and soul of science. Theories that do not fit the facts are of no use and should be discarded. But in biology especially, theories can define what counts as a fact and what does not. Sooner or later startling new observation is made that cannot be accommodated within the existing theoretical framework. New theories are developed and past observations are re-categorised. What was written off as noise is heralded as fact. Thomas Kuhn called this paradigm shift and his paradigmatic case was the Copernican revolution. One overarching theoretical construct is replaced with another—our understanding of the world is literally changed forever.

A problem arises when an organisation such as the Roman Catholic Church erects its doctrinal structure on the shaky foundations of a specific theoretical construct. Biology and developmental biology in particular are comparatively young sciences that are progressing rapidly and are thus quite theoretically diverse. By lending its support to a certain theory or position within biology the Church may well be able to disguise the delicate balance that exists in science whereby theories are valued for their explanatory power or instrumental use, not their doctrinal compatibility. External interest groups with political lobbying power may thus hijack the delicate process of progress in science with dire consequences for future advancement in science and medicine.

The Roman Catholic Church’s influence on science is indirect and usually through the medium of public opinion and public policy. As we have seen in the American debate over the status of the embryo with regards to the derivation of embryonic stem cells this influence may be decisive in the formation of public policy. Indeed President Bush’s decision to effectively ban public funding of embryonic stem cell research in America is widely believed to have set back progress in the field worldwide by many years. The Roman Catholic Church’s input into the embryonic stem cell debate has not been simply moral or ethical as one might assume but has openly defended a particular claim about the biology of the early embryo. Given the basic lack of empirical evidence regarding the embryo and such developments as the unexpected properties of stem cells the Roman Catholic Church’s choice of position on the biology of the embryo seems to be chosen solely as a prop for its doctrinal position. This prop has then been introduced into the secular debate on the status of the embryo as a somehow obvious empirical claim.

I believe the Church’s religious fervour for its preferred doctrinal and scientific position of the day is fundamentally at odds with the process and progress of science. Science is an exploration of the physical world that is characterised by continuous, cumulative and, historically at least, major shifts in understanding. Over the last 400 years the Roman Catholic Church has been slow to accept that science progresses at all and has preferred to maintain its doctrinal position as a matter of faith even when it has been shown to be empirically unsound. My concern here is I think similar to that of Skene.
Non-compliance: a side effect of drug information leaflets

The problem of non-compliance with treatment and its repercussions on the clinical evolution of different conditions has been widely investigated. Non-compliance has also been shown to have significant economic implications, not only as a result of product loss but also indirectly through the complication of disease management and its subsequent healthcare and social costs.

Non-compliance as a health problem

The term “non-compliance” might be taken to refer both to the failure to follow a drug regimen and to the failure to adopt other measures that contribute to improvement in health—for example, changes in lifestyle or diet. This letter focuses on the former.

The term “non-compliance” with a drug regimen can be the result of a number of different factors and a variety of techniques have been developed in an attempt to control it. Of these, the few techniques that have been shown to be effective have only managed to solve the problem in specific situations over short periods of time. The use of such techniques to control non-compliance, particularly where these are effective, raises interesting ethical questions about the extent to which their application constitutes an infringement of the patient’s right to decide on how to manage their own health. Here we suggest that in some cases one factor that leads to non-compliance is the tendency to provide extensive and exhaustive information on side effects in patient information leaflets. Consider the following case.

**A true story**

One morning Dr Smith woke up with a slight cold—muscular aches, headache, chills, and nasal congestion. He decided to take some medicine to counteract its effects. His initial thought was to find something to combat his runny nose, so he chose a product specially indicated for congestion: “StopSniff”.

After reading the product information leaflet, however, Dr Smith felt another kind of chill run down his spine. He was struck cold by the contraindications, warnings, interactions, precautions, and adverse effects listed in the leaflet. If he used this drug, it said, he would run the risk of suffering nausea, anxiety, agitation, insomnia, hallucinations, convulsions, amazement, weariness, arrhythmia, dizziness. Rather than risk all of this, he thought, why not suffer a few bothersome sniffles? For his muscular aches, Dr Smith chose another drug. “Abatache”, but the risks described in the accompanying information leaflet seemed even worse. These included baldness, skin blistering, ascept meningitis, pneumonitis, fatal hepatitis, gastrointestinal perforation, blood in the urine, jaundice, kidney disease, peptic ulceration, mouth ulceration, visual abnormality. So in the end, armed with his clinical and pharmacological knowledge, Dr Smith simply opted to continue blowing his nose and suffer a few muscular aches. He had no desire to play Russian roulette with his health.

**The principle of autonomy and the right to information**

The principle of autonomy in medical ethics places the patient at the centre of medical decision making about his or her care. It places particular emphasis on the importance of informed consent, and suggests that, except in rare situations, no patient should undergo medical treatment or surgical intervention without his or her fully informed authorisation. This is the basis of patient-centred medicine.

To obtain valid informed consent, it is argued that the patient must receive sufficient understandable information to make a fully informed choice. In practice this means that someone undergoing a specific treatment receives information from at least two sources. Firstly, they should be given direct information from their doctor or another health professional about the drug to be taken, recommended lifestyle changes, and perhaps a warning of the hazards related to non-compliance. Additionally, they may also be provided with information on some of the side effects attributed to the drug being prescribed. Individual patients will tend to understand this information in a range of different ways, with each individual’s interpretation based on who they will consult and what information they are likely to place most emphasis on. This information can be used to inform the patient about what may happen should they not take the drug or respond to it as expected.

**So what did the patient decide?**

The patient, shocked and dismayed by the drug’s side effects, finally decides not to follow the doctor’s recommendation. He (or she) will try to relax, perhaps by smoking a cigarette laced with nicotine, tar, and a number of other substances. True enough, doctors recommend giving up smoking. But who will listen to what a doctor says about smoking when they are faced with the need to be prescribed drugs truly hazardous to health? After all, a pack of cigarettes only says that cigarette smoking seriously damages your health. There is certainly no leaflet listing each and every one of its possible side effects. Tobacco kills, but it sometimes looks as if medication is worse.

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We read with interest the papers on informed consent published in a recent issue of the Journal of Medical Ethics.1 Whatever their differences, and however much they questioned some aspects of the duty to respect autonomy through attempting to obtain informed consent for therapeutic interventions, there was a general agreement that competent adult patients are entitled to a core of basic information about their treatment options. There was also consensus that training in the process of obtaining consent is important. In our experience, two dimensions of such training are of particular interest. On the one hand, students need good theoretical understanding of the ethical and legal background to the professional emphasis now placed on informed adverse consent. On the other hand, they need practical training in the relevant communication skills and how to apply them to obtain consent for specific clinical procedures. To do so, doctors must obviously also have a good understanding of these procedures. We recently encountered serious problems in conveying such understanding in a study among junior doctors in England (Schildmann J, Cushing A, Doyal L, Vollmann J. The ethics and law of informed consent: knowledge, views and practice of pre-registration house officers, submitted for publication). No matter how good their philosophical and legal knowledge, preregistration house officers (PRHOs) will not be able to deliver the minimal standards of informed consent outlined by O’Neill unless, suffice it to say, they know what—practically speaking—they are talking about.1

In contrast to Bravo et al’s results (in the same issue of the journal), almost all the PRHOs who took part in our survey had good legal understanding of the differences between competent and incompetent patients.3 This may be interpreted as a positive result of the change in the curriculum that has taken place in the clinical realities they face, and into which they are thrust, is an ongoing problem.4

If informed consent is to fulfil the purpose of respecting the autonomy and dignity of patients, sufficient resources are required to train young doctors to do the job properly, especially as regards their understanding of procedures for which they are providing information and their competence as communicators. One thing is clear: if they cannot complete the task in accordance with the guidance issued by both the General Medical Council and the Department of Health, they should not be doing it at all.1 Trusts and colleges should ensure that all supervisory staff are aware of their responsibilities in this regard.

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Response to ‘Patients could also establish databanks on medical complications’

Gebhardt in his brief report1 pleads for patient organisations to establish databanks on medical complications. Given the references (for example, an article by Paans, a journalist, entitled “Medical errors to be kept secret”), he implies that the substantial danger of misinterpretation of the current situation, which in turn may frustrate the process of increased transparency. We would therefore like to respond to this by giving background information and reasons for some of the choices that were made with respect to the registry of complications mentioned by Gebhardt.

First, a distinction needs to be made between an error and an adverse outcome, which are often confused. From Gebhardt’s reference to the journalist’s article which discusses the same registry of adverse outcomes, but with the title referring to errors, both Gebhardt and the journalist think errors and adverse outcomes are the same thing. However, an error refers to the process in which something has gone wrong, a sub-standard performance, regardless of the outcome. It has been explained by others that such a judgement may have a degree of subjectivity.2 An adverse outcome refers to the outcome which is unwanted but does not necessarily imply that an error has been made. This is why the term “adverse outcomes” is used rather than the term “complications”, since the latter term is often confused with an error being made. The registration of medical complications that Gebhardt refers to is a register of adverse outcomes guided by an unambiguous definition of the term “adverse outcome”, of which only a small percentage is related to errors. Furthermore, some errors will be missed in this registration—that is, errors which have not led to adverse outcomes.

Secondly, with respect to confidentiality, this is relevant in particular for the initial years of such a registry during which it is thoroughly tested and accuracy of the registry may vary widely between participants. Nothing is gained by false positive signals with respect to the high incidence of adverse outcomes in some hospitals, except perhaps by flashing headlines in newspapers. In this respect one may compare the development of such a national registry to the development of a new drug, in which case no one argues about confidentiality, and thorough testing until proved safe. Moreover, a pharmaceutical company will probably be sued if it markets a new drug without proper research. It is intended that after this initial period, national adverse outcomes database become available to the public with respect to probability of an adverse outcome given certain types of surgery.

www.jmedethics.com
Box 1: Patients need information to make a well informed choice

Who is a good doctor and what is a good hospital? This simple question is not easy to answer for those who need patients who need good diagnosis and the best treatment. The NPCF (Dutch Federation of Patients and Consumer Organisations) and its member organisations have published several consumer guides for specific diseases to help patients find their way in the labyrinth of the healthcare system. Patients experience many difficulties in getting access to relevant information from doctors’ organisations and insurance companies. Therefore the NPCF wants to cooperate with these organisations to create consumer information based on the important and relevant data that are available. A joint project for a database on best practices started in September 2003.

Patients are not interested in black lists of doctors and malpractices, they prefer to know about good and best practices to make a well informed choice for a doctor or hospital. They need consumer information on objective measures such as the risk of infection in a hospital, the specific skills of a doctor, how many patients with this specific disease or diagnosis are treated a year, etc. Patients would also like to receive subjective information on a specific hospital or doctor: How is the communication between a doctor and his or her patients? Does the team give enough information and support when needed?, etc. This experience based information is often available from patient organisations.

The NPCF has chosen to work together with organisations of healthcare providers and insurance companies to use parts of their databanks as a basis for consumer information. One task of the NPCF is to translate the data into consumer information that meets the needs of the patients, based on research and experiences of patients. Joint efforts are needed to make this important information accessible for doctors and patients.

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Finally, what does the patient want? (see box 1). International research has shown that patients are more interested in this type of information than are doctors or hospitals to treat certain diseases or to perform certain operations, since the questions they want answered is “What is the best place to go for this type of problem?” That this doctor or hospital has a high adverse outcome record is not relevant, since this may well be explained by the complex patients who are referred to more experienced doctors. As argued in a previous paper, it is essential that there is an increased mutual trust between the medical profession and patients’ organisations that supports a combined effort to improve the quality and availability of patient information. Such initiatives will benefit both patients and doctors and are too important to be frustrated by references to “powers that must be kept under control”.

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What do patients value in their hospital care? A response to Joffe et al

In the Journal of Medical Ethics, Joffe et al recently published an article titled “What do patients value in their hospital care? An empirical perspective on autonomy centred bioethics.” This empirical study evaluates whether patients’ willingness to recommend their hospital to others is more strongly associated with their belief that they were treated with respect and dignity than with their belief that they had an adequate say in their treatment.” Joffe et al go on to suggest that confirmation of these empirical hypotheses would constitute a prescription for elevating the principle of respect for persons to the level that the principle of respect for autonomy currently enjoys in our model of the ideal patient–physician relationship (p 104). In other words, they suggest that by (p 104).

Joffe et al also evaluate whether patients’ reports that they had confidence and trust in their health care providers significantly predicted whether they would recommend the hospital to others. Shekelle et al’s (2001) data support the level that the principle of respect for autonomy currently enjoys in our model of the ideal patient–physician relationship (p 104). In other words, they suggest that by (p 104). Joffe et al also evaluate whether patients’ reports that they had confidence and trust in their health care providers significantly predicted whether they would recommend the hospital to others. Shekelle et al’s (2001) data support the hypothesis that the principle of respect for autonomy currently enjoys in our model of the ideal patient–physician relationship (p 104). In other words, they suggest that by (p 104).

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www.jmedethics.com
Although it is difficult to give a positive answer to these questions (and I will not attempt to do so here), some survey methods, such as the mailed questionnaires that Joffe et al used, seem particularly inadequate. Rawls suggests that certain external conditions favour the formation of considered judgements: “the person making the [considered] judgment [is] presumed to have the ability, the opportunity and the desire to reach a correct decision (or at least, not the desire not to)” (p 48). Very likely, however, many of Joffe et al’s respondents lacked the necessary ability, opportunity, or desire to clarify their moral judgements when responding to the questionnaire they received in the mail. Furthermore, even if a number of patients did offer legitimate considered judgements, there is no way to distinguish these from those made by respondents who lacked the requisite ability or desire. Although the size of Joffe et al’s study is of value for its ability more accurately to reflect a population’s response to its survey questions, because of the practical limitations that come with its size, the study falls short of capturing patients’ considered moral judgements.

Any empirical approach using reflective equilibrium, as Joffe et al, faces a second challenge: why do we want people’s considered moral judgements to influence our theories of ethics in the first place? In his influential critique of reflective equilibrium, D W Haslett writes: “... given the wide differences between people’s considered moral judgments, and given that these differences are, as we know, largely just a reflection of differences in upbringing, culture, religion, and so on, it would appear that, far from having a reason for giving people’s considered moral judgments initial credibility, we have instead a reason for initial skepticism (p 309).”

If moral judgements are liable to reflect superficial prejudices, one could argue, considered moral judgements are liable to reflect deep seated ones. Surely this prejudice is something we would like to overcome, not codify. While I do not think this challenge is insurmountable, it does demand that researchers justify the inclusion of considered judgements in ethical theory before using the method of reflective equilibrium. Joffe et al have failed to do this.

Joffe et al’s study is susceptible to a second line of critique. Even if the study’s use of mailed surveys is appropriate, it fails to capture either patients’ considered judgements or principles, because, put simply, it does not ask for considered judgements or principles. Instead, it asks patients whether providers respected their opinion or respected their autonomy, and then tests patients’ responses to questions against whether they report being satisfied with their care. If a provider’s acting with respect for persons is a better predictor of patient satisfaction than him or her acting with respect for autonomy, Joffe et al conclude that the principle of respect for persons is assigned as much importance, ethically speaking, as the principle of respect for autonomy. As should be clear, this conclusion does not follow from Rawls’s conception of how one constructs a moral theory. In a Rawlsian view, a moral theory requires us to stipulate which principles patients hold, not whether those principles are associated with patient satisfaction. Joffe et al seem to be operating with an underlying utilitarian assumption to the effect that when we try to decide whether a reason is whatever will lead to the greatest patient satisfaction. Although there may be reasons for accepting this utilitarian assumption (which Joffe et al do not provide), certainly there are others for rejecting it. For instance, although patient satisfaction may give a hospital a very good reason to change a policy, we probably do not want to say this reason is a good ethical reason. It is just good business sense. This is an especially important point given the principles that Joffe et al evaluate. Respect for autonomy and respect for persons are traditionally viewed deontologically—that is, it terms of duties or rights, which are valued for their own sake rather than the consequences (such as patient satisfaction) that they produce. In any case, these utility considerations take us far from patients’ actual moral views, the very things Joffe et al, by invoking Rawls’s reflective equilibrium, propose to capture.

Lastly, there is a question of their instrument’s validity. As I have been arguing, Joffe et al claim to assess whether patients are treated according to principles of respect for autonomy and respect for persons. Yet, their single item assessing respect for autonomy—the question, “do you feel you had your say?”—does not do the principle justice. The principle of autonomy not only requires that the health care provider asks the patient for his or her opinion, but also that the provider acts on the patient’s opinion. Their instruments are similarly inadequate for the principle of respect for persons, which, they suggest, includes “autonomy, fidelity, veracity, avoiding killing, and justice,” as well as “respect for the body, respect for family, respect for community, respect for culture, respect for the moral value (dignity of the individual), and respect for the personal narrative” (p 104). How are we to know whether patients had all or any of these in mind when they answered the question: “Did you feel like you were treated with respect and dignity while you were in the hospital?”

Joffe et al acknowledge that these ethical concepts are a bit unwieldy for a survey of manageable length. However, these practical considerations should be used not only to excuse the study but also to question its ability to clarify the ethical concepts it claims to assess. They should prod us to ask, regardless of the survey’s scale and the limitations that its size produces: does this survey really address what we mean by the principles of respect for autonomy and respect for persons?

With any empirical study in bioethics, there is a gap between the empirical hypotheses the study confirms and the normative conclusions its authors would like to draw from it. In their article Joffe et al hoped to bridge this gap by invoking Rawls’s notion of the reflective equilibrium. As I have explored, however, the study does not contribute to either side of the reflective equilibrium they imply, and, thus, they fail to demonstrate how their findings challenge the centrality of autonomy and shared decision making in bioethics.

Joffe et al’s failures are instructive, however, insofar as they suggest we could better bridge the gap between research and theory. The use of the reflective equilibrium in empirical research has promise, provided researchers are clear about: (1) how to define considered moral judgements and/or principles; (2) how their methods capture these judgements and/or principles reliably; (3) how the inclusion of considered moral judgements strengthens rather than weakens bioethical theory; and (4) how their findings are to defeat a particular normative principle, the assumption that those findings challenge must be logically necessary for our holding that principle. For instance, without showing that patients’ desire for autonomy is necessary for our holding the mandatory autonomy view, the studies that Joffe et al cite, even if valid, can be interpreted variously as devaluing the mandatory autonomy view or as recommending that we better educate patients on the value of autonomy. This normative question cannot be settled empirically.

Empirical researchers have the potential to contribute substantially to bioethics, but their work needs the kind of philosophical and empirical rigor that comes from truly interdisciplinary collaboration and must be informed by a careful reflection on the proper relationship between descriptive and normative ethics. Joffe et al take up part of the way down that path. An exciting research itinerary lies ahead.

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How to be a ‘good’ medical student

The public revelation in 2003 that medical students perform intimate examinations without patient consent has engendered much debate in the press and scientific journals. Using this case as a springboard for discussion, I will argue that medical schools should encourage students to raise their ethical concerns and call for a change of policy making it easier for students to do so. I will also address the question of medical students’ moral obligations towards their patients, and conclude that medical students ought to express their discontent when faced with unethical practices or attitudes.

In early January 2003, a study appeared in the British Medical Journal revealing that nearly a quarter of rectal and vaginal examinations on anaesthetised patients were performed by medical students without patient consent.1 Although the study did not generate the firestorm of controversy many expected, it engendered much discussion on ethical issues surrounding informed consent and patient autonomy, as well as stressing the need for greater ethics training for medical students. As an ethical problem, however, the case of intimate examinations is, to my mind, relatively uninteresting. If we agree that it is wrong for doctors to perform a vaginal examination on a conscious person without their consent, then it follows that it will be wrong if that same person is merely asleep. Society would be somewhat chaotic if a person suddenly lost his rights when unconscious. The argument that the anaesthetised patient is unaware of the examination and so cannot be harmed is, at best, questionable. Suppose a newspaper revealed tomorrow that sociology students had placed hidden cameras in the cubicles of public toilets to study urination habits. Most people would be understandably outraged by this violation of privacy, even though the victims were not harmed by it at the time. This is based on the belief that a person’s rights can be violated without that person’s knowledge.

As for the conflict between the educational need of students and the respect for patient autonomy, it would only arise if an overwhelming number of patients refused to be examined. This is an unlikely scenario, as a commentary on Dr Coldicott’s study, Brittinger Nesheim, a professor of obstetrics and gynaecology in Norway, affirms that obtaining patient consent to student examinations is not difficult as long as the patient feels comfortable with the arrangements. Yet for me the study raises a more interesting question which extends beyond the reconstitute sphere of intimate examinations. It concerns the moral obligations of medical students faced with ethically dubious situations. In short, what should a ‘good’ medical student do?

In an article on the scope of medical ethics, Professor Raanan Gillon recounts two experiences from his days as a medical student.7 The first describes his teacher’s refusal to grant an abortion to a 14 year old girl on the grounds that she was “a slut”; the second his own refusal to examine a scrotal lump on a patient whose testicles had already been examined by five other students. Gillon’s objections were very much the exception. When these events took place in the 1960s, medical students were simply expected to follow their teachers’ orders and to absorb their evident wisdom without question. Since then, medical ethics has developed from an imitative subject to an academic discipline in its own right, with specific journals and associations, and a place in the medical curriculum.

Judging from some of the comments from students at Bristol, however, the growing awareness of medical ethics has not dispelled the awkward climate of unquestioned reverence towards the medical establishment and individual teachers. Students should not have to perform heroic acts of courage to raise ethical concerns. In light of medical ethics’ place in the curriculum, the situation is deeply paradoxical. Students may be taught the importance of respecting the patient’s autonomy one day, but witness an obvious violation of this principle by their teachers the next. For the subject to be of any use, students must not only be allowed, but positively encouraged, to put into practice their knowledge without the fear of appearing “inadequate and stupid”. If a student’s ethical concerns remain unresolved after discussion with the teacher, there should be formal mechanisms of complaint, perhaps through a committee specifically set up for that purpose, or through the school’s medical ethicist, who would then investigate the matter thoroughly. Medical ethics is, after all, an applied discipline.

It is nonetheless all too easy to blame the medical establishment and individual teachers for the unethical behaviour of students, as if the apellation “medical student” shielded individuals from moral fault. In Nick Hornby’s novel “How to be good”, the narrator, an adulterous GP and mother of two, resolves her moral conundrums by mechanically repeating “I must be good. I’m a doctor.”8 It is only later that she acknowledges that her justification is too facile: “It’s not enough to just be a doctor, you have to be a good doctor”. Students, however wide eyed or intimidated, should be encouraged to think independently about the ethics of examinations. Their personal values should not vanish as they put on the white coat, just as a patient’s rights should not evaporate when under anaesthetic. Although the reluctance of many Bristol students to perform the examinations is comforting, it seems that none acted on their qualms by declining to perform the procedure or asking that proper consent be obtained. Neither the diminished responsibility of the medical student, nor his status as an apprentice, removes the need for ethical reflection in daily proceedings. Indeed, far from absolving him from moral inquiry, these factors should encourage a process of ethical questioning. This exercise is, to my mind, crucial to a student’s flourishing and to his future as a morally responsible future doctor. To paraphrase Nick Hornby: “it’s not enough to just be a medical student”.

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JME editorial office has now moved

The JME editorial office has now moved to BMA House. The new contact details are: Journal of Medical Ethics, BMA House, Tavistock Square, London WC1H 9JR. Tel: +44 (0) 207 383 6439. Fax: +44 (0) 207 383 6668. The point of contact is Naynah Siva, Editorial Assistant.

Institute of Medical Ethics Medical Student Electives

The JME wishes to award 10 bursaries of up to £500 each to support Medical Student Electives, or exceptionally Special Study Modules, on issues in medical ethics.

Medical students, jointly with their supervisor, are invited to apply by 28th February 2005. Application is to be done via email, explaining the project’s relevance to medical ethics and the reasons why a bursary is requested. An outline study protocol and project budget should be included or attached.

Applications should be sent to Mrs M Bannatyne, IME Bursaries Administrator, email: bannatyne@dial.pipex.com.

Successful applicants will be informed by 31st March 2005.

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An error has been pointed out in the affiliation for R Andorno, author of The right not to know: an autonomy approach (J Med Ethics 2004;30:435–439). The correct affiliation is Interdepartmental Center for Ethics in the Sciences and Humanities (IZEW), University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany. The journal apologises for this error.