DeGrazia on the ethics of abortion

In Chapter 2, entitled ‘Prenatal Moral Status and Ethics’, DeGrazia outlines his views on the ethics of abortion. DeGrazia deals thoughtfully and in a nuanced way with the ethics of prenatal moral status and it is to his credit that he strives to give the fairest reading to a range of pro-life arguments. Aside from scholarly integrity, DeGrazia has a principled commitment to taking seriously those who believe that the foetus/embryo has moral status. His liberal pluralism regarding the permissibility of abortion means that ‘[u]nlike nearly every philosopher I know who holds a liberal view on prenatal moral status and/or the ethics of abortion and embryo research’ he believes ‘that a broadly pro-life approach remains standing as a reasonable option’ (p.43).1 Specifically, DeGrazia ends up endorsing the view that abortion is generally permissible but is it not necessary to publicly fund such care.

DeGrazia's arguments on the ethics of abortion rest on his defence of a tripartite framework for understanding prenatal moral status. The three prongs of this framework are:

1. A biological essentialist account of identity (p.24).1

2. Sentience is a relevant criterion for moral status (p.29).1

3. A form of the time relative interests argument whereby ‘a right to life depends on a strong interest in remaining alive’ (pp.33–34).1

It is not the purpose of this commentary to engage in a critique of DeGrazia's arguments on these points. Rather, the above is outlined so that the reader gets a sense of the basis of DeGrazia's position. However, I would like to …