Article info
Responses
We must not create beings with moral standing superior to our own
- Correspondence to Nicholas Agar, Philosophy Program, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington 4001, New Zealand; nicholas.agar{at}vuw.ac.nz
Citation
We must not create beings with moral standing superior to our own
Publication history
- Received November 25, 2012
- Accepted January 22, 2013
- First published February 22, 2013.
Online issue publication
October 15, 2013
Article Versions
- Previous version (22 February 2013).
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