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Voluntary moral enhancement and the survival-at-any-cost bias
  1. Vojin Rakić
  1. Correspondence to Professor Vojin Rakić, Center for the Study of Bioethics, Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade, Beograd 11000, Serbia; vojinrakic{at}hotmail.com

Abstract

I discuss the argument of Persson and Savulescu that moral enhancement ought to accompany cognitive enhancement, as well as briefly addressing critiques of this argument, notably by John Harris. I argue that Harris, who believes that cognitive enhancement is largely sufficient for making us behave more morally, might be disposing too easily of the great quandary of our moral existence: the gap between what we do and what we believe is morally right to do. In that regard, Persson and Savulescu's position has the potential to offer more. However, I question Persson and Savulescu's proposal of compulsory moral enhancement (a conception they used to promote), proposing the alternative of voluntary moral enhancement.

  • Enhancement
  • Neuroethics
  • Philosophical Ethics
  • Psychopharmacology
  • Political Philosophy

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