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Killing versus totally disabling: a reply to critics
- Correspondence to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Philosophy Department, Duke University, Box 90432, Durham, NC 27708, USA; ws66{at}duke.edu
Citation
Killing versus totally disabling: a reply to critics
Publication history
- Received October 24, 2012
- Accepted October 24, 2012
- First published November 17, 2012.
Online issue publication
April 27, 2016
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