Article info
PDFExtended essay
Response
What moral status should be accorded to those human beings who have profound intellectual disabilities? A reply to Curtis and Vehmas
- Correspondence to Professor Hugh V McLachlan, Department of Social Science, Media and Journalism, Glasgow Caledonian University, Cowdaddens Road, Glasgow G4 0BA, UK; h.mclachlan{at}gcu.ac.uk
Citation
What moral status should be accorded to those human beings who have profound intellectual disabilities? A reply to Curtis and Vehmas
Publication history
- Received March 22, 2016
- Accepted April 12, 2016
- First published April 28, 2016.
Online issue publication
July 26, 2016
Article Versions
- Previous version (26 July 2016).
- You are viewing the most recent version of this article.
Request permissions
If you wish to reuse any or all of this article please use the link below which will take you to the Copyright Clearance Center’s RightsLink service. You will be able to get a quick price and instant permission to reuse the content in many different ways.
Copyright information
Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/
Other content recommended for you
- A Moorean argument for the full moral status of those with profound intellectual disability
- Genetic enhancement, post-persons and moral status: a reply to Buchanan
- Genetic Enhancement, Post-persons, and Moral Status: Author reply to commentaries
- Egalitarianism, moral status and abortion: a reply to Miller
- Moral uncertainty and the farming of human-pig chimeras
- Should we enhance animals?
- Pregnancy and superior moral status: a proposal for two thresholds of personhood
- Human embryonic stem cell research debates: a Confucian argument
- Lessons from Frankenstein 200 years on: brain organoids, chimaeras and other ‘monsters’
- Fetuses, newborns, & parental responsibility