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Theoretical ethics
Could it be permissible to prevent the existence of morally enhanced people?
- Correspondence to Dr Ingmar Persson Department of Philosophy, University of Gothenburg, Box 200, Gothenburg 40530, Sweden; ingmar.persson{at}filosofi.gu.se
Citation
Could it be permissible to prevent the existence of morally enhanced people?
Publication history
- Accepted July 20, 2012
- First published August 23, 2012.
Online issue publication
April 27, 2016
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