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PDFEssay
The problems with utilitarian conceptions of personhood in the abortion debate
- Correspondence to Daniel R A Cox, University of Bristol, Faculty of Medicine and Dentistry, 39-41 St Michaels Hill, Bristol BS2 8DZ, UK; dc5771{at}bris.ac.uk
Citation
The problems with utilitarian conceptions of personhood in the abortion debate
Publication history
- Received August 25, 2010
- Revised November 3, 2010
- Accepted December 10, 2010
- First published January 26, 2011.
Online issue publication
February 07, 2017
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- Previous version (27 April 2016).
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© 2011, Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.
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