Harris, harmed states, and sexed bodies
- Correspondence to Dr Robert Sparrow, Centre for Human Bioethics, School of Philosophical, Historical, and International Studies, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia; robert.sparrow{at}arts.monash.edu.au
- Received 1 September 2010
- Revised 3 November 2010
- Accepted 10 December 2010
Abstract
This paper criticises John Harris's attempts to defend an account of a ‘harmed condition’ that can stand independently of intuitions about what is ‘normal’. I argue that because Homo sapiens is a sexually dimorphic species, determining whether a particular individual is in a harmed condition or not will sometimes require making reference to the normal capacities of their sex. Consequently, Harris's account is unable to play the role he intends for it in debates about the ethics of human enhancement.
- Bioethics
- biomedical enhancement
- concept of health
- enhancement
- genetic enhancement
- harm
- human enhancement
- John Harris
Footnotes
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See Commentary, p 262
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Competing interests None.
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Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.
