Article Text
Abstract
In a previous paper, I had argued that Strong’s counterexamples to Marquis’s argument against abortion—according to which terminating fetuses is wrong because it deprives them of a valuable future—fail either because they have no bearing on Marquis’s argument or because they make unacceptable claims about what constitutes a valuable future. In this paper I respond to Strong’s criticism of my argument according to which I fail to acknowledge that Marquis uses “future like ours” and “valuable future” interchangeably. I show that my argument does not rely on not acknowledging that “future like ours” and “valuable future” are interchangeable; and that, rather, it is exactly by replacing “future like ours” with “valuable future” that I construct my argument against Strong. I conclude with some remarks on how Marquis’s concept of “future like ours” should be interpreted.
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