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J Med Ethics 2008;34:875-876 doi:10.1136/jme.2007.023986
  • Ethics

Better to exist: a reply to Benatar

  1. S D Baum
  1. Seth D Baum, Department of Geography, 302 Walker Building, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA; sbaum{at}psu.edu
  • Received 5 December 2007
  • Revised 5 May 2008
  • Accepted 9 May 2008

Abstract

A recent exchange on Benatar’s book Better never to have been between Doyal and Benatar discusses Benatar’s bold claim that people should not be brought into existence. Here, I expand the discussion of original position that the exchange focused on. I also discuss the asymmetries, between benefit and harm and between existence and non-existence, upon which Benatar’s bold claim rests. In both discussions, I show how Benatar’s bold claim can be rejected.

Footnotes

  • Competing interests: None declared.

  • ↵i Expected utility maximisation reduces to classical utilitarianism for circumstances in which no uncertainty exists.

  • ↵ii A similar discussion of maximin is found on page 173 of Leslie’s The end of the world.6

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