Concepts of “person” and “liberty,” and their implications to our fading notions of autonomy
- Correspondence to: Dr T Takala Centre for Social Ethics and Policy, School of Law, The University of Manchester, Williamson Building, Oxford Road, Manchester M1 5NG, UK; tuija.takala{at}helsinki.fi
- Received 26 March 2006
- Accepted 26 May 2006
- Revised 26 March 2006
Abstract
It is commonly held that respect for autonomy is one of the most important principles in medical ethics. However, there are a number of interpretations as to what that respect actually entails in practice and a number of constraints have been suggested even on our self-regarding choices. These limits are often justified in the name of autonomy. In this paper, it is argued that these different interpretations can be explained and understood by looking at the discussion from the viewpoints of positive and negative liberty and the various notions of a “person” that lay beneath. It will be shown how all the appeals to positive liberty presuppose a particular value system and are therefore problematic in multicultural societies.
Footnotes
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Competing interests: None.
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This article was produced as a part of the project Ethical and Social Aspects of Bioinformatics (ESABI), financed between 2004 and 2007 by the Academy of Finland (SA 105139).
