Can arguments address concerns?
- Correspondence to: Matti HäyryCentre for Social Ethics and Policy, School of Law, The University of Manchester, Williamson Building, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, UK; matti.hayrymanchester.ac.uk
- Received 9 July 2004
- Accepted 20 January 2005
- Revised 18 January 2005
Abstract
People have concerns, and ethicists often respond to them with philosophical arguments. But can conceptual constructions properly address fears and anxieties? It is argued in this paper that while it is possible to voice, clarify, create and—to a certain extent—tackle concerns by arguments, more concrete practices, choices, and actions are normally needed to produce proper responses to people’s worries. While logical inconsistencies and empirical errors can legitimately be exposed by arguments, the situation is considerably less clear when it comes to moral, cultural, and emotional norms, values, and expectations.







