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Re: First: A Right to BE born . . .

Dear Editor

As a bioethicist who works with and is a former board member of the Canadian Down syndrome Society (CDSS)I was thankful that Julian Savulesque noted the argument that "fetuses with Down's syndrome are 'devalued' and that this represents discrimination.

The perspective of the CDSS is that Down is a condition and not a disease. Persons with Down while different must be taken as equal members of society, persons with specific and individual strengths and weaknesses. To argue more generally a right to abort on the basis of their genetic difference is to permit a eugenic pruning on the basis of incomplete knowledge, and prejudice.

Down syndrome has always been in the forefront of the right against genetic discrimination. It stands as a signal test case of the ease with which ethicist and practitioners argue on the basis of parental choice for selective abortion without considering the elements of social context that may make parenting (or living with) a person of difference so challenging. Thus I would argue that before considering the "right" for abortion on the basis of genetic profile (sex, trisomy 21, 18, etc.) one must first addres those elements that disadvantage to person who results.

These elements may include social prejudices (hence the location of the example in India), social deprivation, limitations on social services and support for persons of difference. If, as I and some others in the "disability movement" argue, these are the critical factors involved in such decisions then to not address them in this discourse is a grevious failing and bad eugenics.

Finally, it is important to note that the issue of Down, and of a fetuses choice, have greater resonance in the debate over persons of difference generally. Assumptions concerning those with physically or congitively restricted futures as a result of adult onset of disease (Huntington Disease) or injury (spinal injury) are a transposition of this concern to the greater field of disability studies.

Hopefully, in a future article these will all be addressed as a singular critique of the assumptions that many bring to the simple assumption that parental rights and utilitarian sense argue for selective abortion, or among adults, termination, of those who are physically and cognitively distinct.

Tom Koch

adj. professor geography (medical), Unviersity of British Columbia

adj. professor gerontology, Simon Fraser University