Correspondence to:
Dr M Epstein
Academic Unit for Human Science And medical Ethics, Institute of Health Sciences Education, Centre for Health Sciences, St. Bartholomew’s and the Royal London School of Medicine and Dentistry, Queen Mary, University of London, Turner St., London E1 2AD, UK; m.epstein@qmul.ac.uk
Original version received 3 May 2006
Revised version received
21 June 2006
Accepted for publication
25 June 2006
A theoretical platform for a much-needed change in the provision of healthcare based on restoring the autonomy of doctor–patient relationships
| The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below. |
The resort to pretence in both the process of common law reasoning and the language used by other institutions, generally referred to as legal fiction and institutional fiction, respectively (or simply fiction), is a paradoxical phenomenon. On the one hand, it seems to be incompatible with systems that claim to derive their moral legitimacy from the uncompromising quest for hard evidence, fact and truth. On the other, it has a long tradition going back as far as the time of Roman law.1 It is very common in, and arguably central to, the modern social institutions. It is frequently manifest even to the lay observer.
Even more perplexing is the fact that this phenomenon has rarely invoked the intellectual interest it begs. Indeed, historical accounts of the common law often discuss it and it does have an entry in most legal dictionaries. Yet, the discourse that both . . . [Full text of this article]
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