Ethics

Is human existence worth its consequent harm?

Correspondence to:
Professor L Doyal, Queen Mary, University of London, 708 Willoughby House, The Barbican, London EC2Y 8BN, UK; l.doyal{at}qmul.ac.uk

Benatar argues that it is better never to have been born because of the harms always associated with human existence. Non-existence entails no harm, along with no experience of the absence of any benefits that existence might offer. Therefore, he maintains that procreation is morally irresponsible, along with the use of reproductive technology to have children. Women should seek termination if they become pregnant and it would be better for potential future generations if humans become extinct as soon as humanely possible. These views are challenged by the argument that while decisions not to procreate may be rational on the grounds of the harm that might occur, it may equally rational to gamble under certain circumstances that future children would be better-off experiencing the harms and benefits of life rather than never having the opportunity of experiencing anything. To the degree that Benatar’s arguments preclude the potential rationality of any such gamble, their moral relevance to concrete issues concerning human reproduction is weakened. However, he is right to emphasise the importance of foreseen harm when decisions are made to attempt to have children.

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This article has been cited by other articles:

• Benatar, D (2009). Grim news for an unoriginal position: a reply to Seth Baum. J. Med. Ethics 35: 328-329 [Abstract] [Full Text]  
• Baum, S D (2008). Better to exist: a reply to Benatar. J. Med. Ethics 34: 875-876 [Abstract] [Full Text]  
• Benatar, D. (2007). Grim news from the original position: a reply to Professor Doyal. J. Med. Ethics 33: 577-577 [Abstract] [Full Text]