JME

HOME HELP FEEDBACK SUBSCRIPTIONS ARCHIVE SEARCH TABLE OF CONTENTS REGISTER
[Advanced]

This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow Submit a response
Right arrow Read responses to this article
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me when eLetters are posted
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this link to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in PubMed
Right arrow Add article to my folders
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Garrard, E
Right arrow Articles by Wilkinson, S
Right arrow Search for Related Content
PubMed
Right arrow PubMed Citation
Right arrow Articles by Garrard, E
Right arrow Articles by Wilkinson, S
Related Collections
Right arrow Legal Issues (incl forensic medicine)
Right arrow End of Life Decisions
J Med Ethics 2005;31:64-68
© 2005 BMJ Publishing Group Ltd & Institute of Medical Ethics


CLINICAL ETHICS

Passive euthanasia

E Garrard, S Wilkinson

Centre for Professional Ethics, Keele University, Staffordshire, UK

Correspondence to:
S Wilkinson
Centre for Professional Ethics, Keele University, Keele Hall, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG, UK; s.wilkinson{at}peak.keele.ac.uk The idea of passive euthanasia has recently been attacked in a particularly clear and explicit way by an "Ethics Task Force" established by the European Association of Palliative Care (EAPC) in February 2001. It claims that the expression "passive euthanasia" is a contradiction in terms and hence that there can be no such thing. This paper critically assesses the main arguments for the Task Force’s view. Three arguments are considered. Firstly, an argument based on the (supposed) wrongness of euthanasia and the (supposed) permissibility of what is often called passive euthanasia. Secondly, the claim that passive euthanasia (so-called) cannot really be euthanasia because it does not cause death. And finally, a consequence based argument which appeals to the (alleged) bad consequences of accepting the category of passive euthanasia.

We conclude that although healthcare professionals’ nervousness about the concept of passive euthanasia is understandable, there is really no reason to abandon the category provided that it is properly and narrowly understand and provided that "euthanasia reasons" for withdrawing or withholding life-prolonging treatment are carefully distinguished from other reasons.


Keywords: euthanasia; palliative care; passive euthanasia; withdrawing and withholding treatment




This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
J. Med. EthicsHome page
C Leget
Boundaries, borders, and limits. A phenomenological reflection on ethics and euthanasia
J. Med. Ethics, May 1, 2006; 32(5): 256 - 259.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

eLetters:

Read all eLetters

Passive euthanasia
Allen B Shaw
JME Online, 20 Apr 2005 [Full text]



HOME HELP FEEDBACK SUBSCRIPTIONS ARCHIVE SEARCH TABLE OF CONTENTS REGISTER
Terms and conditions relating to subscriptions purchased online  ¦  Website terms and conditions  ¦  Privacy policy
Copyright © 2005 by the BMJ Publishing Group Ltd & Institute of Medical Ethics.